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ARTICLES
A LENDER'S LIABILITY FOR AGENT MISDEEDS
Kenneth M. Lodge,*
Ronald L. Sandack**
Thomas J. Cunningham***
"The rich ruleth over the poor; and the borrower is servant to him
that lendeth."'
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the fastest growing areas of litigation in the 1980s was
lender liability.' During that decade, borrowers and third-party
creditors began relying upon securities law and other statutory reme-
dies to recover damages they suffered as a result of lender miscon-
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the New Jersey and Illinois Bars; partner at the Chicago law firm of Smith Williams & Lodge
Chartered, with concentration in commercial and banking litigation.
** B.A., University of Illinois; J.D., DePaul University; member of the Illinois Bar;
associated with the Chicago law firm of Smith Williams & Lodge Chartered.
*** B.S., Arizona State University; J.D., 1993, DePaul University; former Executive
Editor of the DePaul Business Law Journal; member of Illinois Bar; associated with the Chi-
cago law firm of Smith Williams & Lodge Chartered.
1. Proverbs, 22:7.
2. See, e.g., W. Mike Baggett & Charles F. Byrd, Avoiding Winning Lender Liability
Suits, AM. BANKER, Sept. 13, 1990, at 4; Kenneth L. Howe, Failing Businesses Dragging
Banks to the Courtroom, SAN FRANCISCO Bus. J., Sept. 22, 1986, at 1; Henry A. Hubschman
& Jesse M. Caplan, A Voice of Reason on Lender Liability, AM. BANKER, July 30, 1990, at
5; L. A. Hughes, Small Banks Fear Spread of Lender Liability Suits, S. FLA. Bus. J., Aug.
10, 1987, at 25; IBAA Urges Support for Legislative Solution to Lender Liability Problem,
PR Newswire, June 18, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File, at 4; Rash of
Lender Liability Suits Seen Peaking as Lenders Adjust, 49 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 7, at
310 (Aug. 17, 1987); Herbert Swartz, New Business Trend: If Loan Goes Bad, Sue Your
Banker, NEW ORLEANS Bus., May 26, 1986, at IA; Kirk Victor, Lender Liability Doctrine
Gives Creditors Clout Suing the Bankers, NAT'L L. J., Sept. 1, 1986, at 1. But see Lenders
Now Turn the Tables, Sue Borrowers for Tort Awards, 53 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 15, at
561 (Oct. 16, 1989).
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duct.' When statutory remedies were not available, borrowers and
third-party creditors turned to common law theories to hold lenders
liable.
A. Common Law Theories
Many common law theories were developed and applied in the
area of lender liability. These theories included breach of contract,4
breach of fiduciary duty,' breach of duty of good faith and fair deal-
ing,6 actual fraud,7 constructive fraud,' duress,9 tortious interference
3. Iden v. Adrian Buckhannon Bank, 841 F.2d 1122 (4th Cir. 1988) (Bank Holding
Company Act); Sundance Land Corp. v. Community First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 840 F.2d
653 (9th Cir. 1988) (Home Owners Loan Act); Red Fox Indus., Inc. v. Federal Say. & Loan
Ins. Corp., 832 F.2d 340 (5th Cir. 1987) (Sherman and Clayton Acts); Wilcox v. First Inter-
state Bank, 815 F.2d 522 (9th Cir. 1987) (RICO and Sherman Act); NCNB Nat'l Bank v.
Tiller, 814 F.2d 931 (4th Cir. 1987) (RICO); Atkinson v. Anadarko Bank & Trust Co., 808
F.2d 438 (5th Cir.) (per curiam) (RICO), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1032 (1987); McGee v. First
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 761 F.2d 647 (11th Cir.) (per curiam) (Sherman Act and Bank
Holding Company Act), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 905 (1985); Warren v. Manufacturers Nat'l
Bank, 759 F.2d 542 (6th Cir. 1985) (RICO); Amey v. Gulf Abstract & Title, Inc., 758 F.2d
1486 (11 th Cir.) (Sherman Act), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1107 (1985); Rae v. Union Bank, 725
F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1984) (Bank Holding Company Act); Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Alabama
Bank, 679 F.2d 242 (11 th Cir. 1982) (Bank Holding Company Act), rev'd on other grounds,
474 U.S. 518 (1986); Tose v. First Pa. Bank, 648 F.2d 879 (3d Cir.) (Sherman Act and Bank
Holding Company Act), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 893 (1981); Brown v. Visa U.S.A., 674 F.
Supp. 249 (N.D. 11. 1987) (Sherman Act); Wunderle v. Central Trust Co., 829 F.2d 1127
(6th Cir. 1987) (RICO); Hunt v. Bankers Trust Co., 1987-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 67,520
(N.D. Tex. 1987) (Sherman Act); Satellite Fin. Planning Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, 633 F.
Supp. 386 (D. Del. 1986) (Sherman Act); Grant v. Union Bank, 629 F. Supp. 570 (D. Utah
1986) (RICO); Nordic Bank v. Trend Group, Ltd., 619 F. Supp. 542 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (Sher-
man Act).
This article does not discuss any statutory lender liability causes of action. Readers inter-
ested in these causes of action are directed to Michael A. Kahn & Richard E. Gentry, Recent
Developments in Lender Liability Litigation Under RICO, Sherman Antitrust Act, and Bank
Holding Company Act, in LENDER LIABILITY LITIGATION 1988: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
367 (PLI 1988).
4. Landes Constr. Co. v. Royal Bank of Canada, 833 F.2d 1365, 1371 (9th Cir. 1987);
National Farmers Org., Inc. v. Kinsley Bank, 731 F.2d 1464, 1469-70 (10th Cir. 1984);
Shaughnessy v. Mark Twain State Bank, 715 S.W.2d 944, 949 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
5 Whitney v. Citibank, 782 F.2d 1106, 1115 (2d Cir. 1986).
6. K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 759 (6th Cir. 1985); Alaska
Statebank v. Fairco, 674 P.2d 288, 291 (Alaska 1983); Seaman's Direct Buying Serv. v. Stan-
dard Oil Co., 686 P.2d 1158, 1166 (Cal. 1984); Commercial Cotton Co. v. United Cal. Bank,
209 Cal. Rptr. 551, 554 (Ct. App. 1985); Tribby v. Northwestern Bank, 704 P.2d 409, 419
(Mont. 1985); First Nat'l Bank v. Twombly, 689 P.2d 1226, 1230 (Mont. 1984); see also
Sandra Chutorian, Note, Tort Remedies for Breach of Contract: The Expansion of Tortious
Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing into the Commercial Realm,
86 COLUM. L. REV. 377 (1986).
7. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Central Nat'l Bank, 773 F.2d 771, 778 (7th
Cir. 1985); Sanchez-Corea v. Bank of America, 701 P.2d 826, 838 (Cal. 1985); State Nat'l
Bank v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661, 680 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
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with contractual and business relations,10 negligent misrepresenta-
tion,11 and excessive control.12
This article discusses the use of agency principles" in the con-
text of two of these common law actions by a borrower against its
lender. Specifically, the article analyzes the law of interfer-
ence-particularly interference with corporate governance, the new-
est theory of lender liability" 4-and excessive control, which is often
styled as an action for equitable subordination. 5 The article advo-
cates an approach to interference and control liability that would
provide a remedy to a borrower for damages suffered as a result of a
lender's wrongful interference and control of the borrower. These
theories have been applied through the use of ordinary "tort analy-
sis." 1  In other words, a lender would be liable to a borrower for
interference and control if the lender takes some action from which it
is reasonably foreseeable that damage will result. 7
This article explores the concept of holding a lender vicariously
liable for the acts of individuals who further the aims of the lender
8. Central States Stamping v. Terminal Equip. Co., 727 F.2d 1405, 1408 (6th Cir.
1984); Barrett v. Bank of America, 229 Cal. Rptr. 16, 20 (Ct. App. 1986); Deist v. Waccholz,
678 P.2d 188, 192 (Mont. 1984).
9. Pecos Constr. Co. v. Mortgage Inv. Co., 459 P.2d 842, 844 (N.M. 1969); State Nat'l
Bank, 678 S.W.2d at 684.
10. Melamed v. Lake County Nat'l Bank, 727 F.2d 1399, 1403 (6th Cir. 1984); State
Nat'l Bank, 678 S.W.2d at 698.
11. First Fed. Say. & Loan Assoc. v. Caudle, 425 So. 2d 1050, 1052 (Ala. 1983); Jac-
ques v. First Nat'l Bank, 515 A.2d 756, 760 (Md. 1986).
12. Krivo Indus. Supply Co. v. National Distillers & Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 1098,
1103 (5th Cir. 1973); Harris Trust & Say. Bank v. Keig (In re Prima Co.), 98 F.2d 952, 966
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 658 (1938).
13. Agency is defined in the Restatement as "the fiduciary relation which results from
the manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and
subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 1(1) (1958). " 'Agency' is a consensual, fiduciary relationship between two legal
entities created by law by which the principal has the right to control the conduct of the agent
and the agent has the power to effect the legal relations of the principal." 1 I.L.P. Agency § 2
(1988) (citing Gunther v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 467 N.E.2d 1104 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984);
Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wessels, 449 N.E.2d 897 (II1. App. Ct. 1983)). The word
"agent" comes from the Latin verb "ago, agere" and the noun "agens, agentis," which means
one who acts, a doer, force or power that accomplishes things. HAROLD G. REUSCHLEIN &
WILLIAM A. GREGORY, AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP 1 (1979).
Agency theory is intended to "enable a person, through the services of another, to broaden
the scope of his activities and receive the product of another's efforts, paying such other for
what he does but retaining for himself any net benefit resulting from the work performed." Id.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 19-29.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 31-33.
16. See, e.g., Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 68 (1971).
1 7. See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 50, at 288-309
(3d ed. 1964).
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through some misconduct that results in damage to the borrower. In
doing so, the article scrutinizes the law of agency and provides new
definitions of several key terms. It is suggested that the reason
agency concepts have not often been applied in lender liability cases
is that the courts are frequently confused about the terms "master,"
"servant," "independent contractor," and "nonservant agent."' 18 By
categorizing and defining when an individual falls into one of these
categories, the theories of lender liability based upon interference
and control become much simpler to apply and are more fair to both
the lender and the borrower.
1. Interference
Interference with contractual relations is a common law tort
theory that has existed since at least the First Restatement of
Torts. 9 A newer breed of this tort is tortious interference with cor-
porate governance.20 Both actions may provide a basis for the appli-
cation of agency principles if a lender "interferes" by "placing" an
agent in the borrower's operations.2"
a. Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations
The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines the four elements of
an action sounding in tortious interference with contractual rela-
tions.22 First, there must be a valid contract that is subject to inter-
ference. Second, there must be a willful and intentional act of inter-
ference. Third, the act must proximately cause the plaintiff some
damage. And fourth, the plaintiff must suffer some actual loss or
damage.2"
Interference may be justified under certain circumstances,2 ' but
there is no absolute privilege to interfere with another's contractual
relations. 5 Privilege exists only when there is a legitimate economic
18. See 53 AM. JUR. 2D Master and Servant § 1 (1970).
19. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 766 (1939); see also Fowler V. Harper, Interference
with Contractual Relations, 47 Nw. U. L. REV. 873 (1953); Charles E. Carpenter, Interfer-
ence with Contractual Relations, 41 HARv. L. REV. 728 (1928).
20. See, e.g., State Nat'l Bank v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661, 698 (Tex Ct. App.
1984).
21. Id. at 684.
22. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766A (1979).
23. Id.
24. See id. § 767 (including a disinterested desire to protect the obligor, an act done in
order to further public morality, and an attorney advising a firm to breach an existing
contract).
25. See Frank Colson, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 488 F.2d 202, 206 (5th Cir. 1974).
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interest that can only be protected by the particular interference. 6 In
addition, the assertion of privilege requires the interfering party to
act fairly.2
7
b. Tortious Interference with Corporate Governance
While tortious interference with a contract or contractual rela-
tions usually involves interference by a defendant with a relationship
between a plaintiff and a third party," tortious interference with
corporate governance applies when a lender interferes directly with
the management and control of a borrower's business operation. The
concept of direct interference with a borrower's business was devel-
oped in the case of State National Bank v. Farah Manufacturing
Co.
2 9
This new tort is further examined in this article."0 Special em-
phasis will be placed on the role that agency law and respondeat
superior play in alleging interference with corporate governance by a
lender.
2. Excessive Control
Excessive control of a borrower by its lender is not a tort per se.
Rather, lenders have been sued upon theories which allege that the
borrower became the mere instrumentality or alter ego of the lender.
These cases are often filed by other creditors of the borrower who
argue that certain debts should be subordinated to others."1 Usually
26. See Jeremy w. Dickens, Equitable Subordination and Analogous Theories of
Lender Liability: Toward a New Model of Control, 65 TEX. L. REV. 801, 844 (1987).
27. See, e.g., Services, Inc. v. Control Data Corp., 759 F.2d 1241, 1249 (5th Cir. 1985)
(requiring fair competition even when privilege is claimed).
28. E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766. The Restatement provides:
One who intentionally and improperly interferes with the performance of a con-
tract . . . between another and a third person by inducing or otherwise causing
the third person not to perform the contract, is subject to liability to the other
for the pecuniary loss resulting to the other from the failure of the third person
to perform the contract.
Id.
29. State Nat'l Bank v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661, 88-90 (Tex. App. Ct. 1984);
see also Melamed v. Lake County Nat'l Bank, 727 F.2d 1399, 1403 (6th Cir. 1984) (asserting
a claim based upon a creditor's plan to tortiously interfere with a debtor's business).
30. See discussion infra part III.A.
31. E.g., Krivo Indus. Supply Co. v. National Distillers & Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d
1098, 1101 (5th Cir. 1973) (instrumentality); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Jet Stream, Ltd., 790
F. Supp. 1130, 1133 (M.D. Fla. 1992) (joint venture); In re Beverages Int'l, 50 B.R. 273, 281
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1981) (alter ego); A. Gay Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 309 N.W.2d
285, 290 (Minn. 1981) (agency).
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such a case involves a lawsuit by another creditor who has been frus-
trated in its attempt to collect from the debtor.82 These cases are
described as equitable subordination cases. 88
This article, however, is directed at something different. The
factual scenario discussed here involves a lender who forces certain
personnel upon the borrower. These individuals are selected by the
lender and cause damage to the borrower's business. The borrower
complains that such control over it by the lender is wrongful and
that the lender is liable for the damage caused by the personnel
forced upon the borrower. Once again, agency law will be key to
holding the lender responsible.
B. The Need for the Application of Agency Principles to Lender
Liability
While many would argue that the world contains too many the-
ories of lender liability already, 4 there are circumstances under
which lender misconduct may not be actionable without an applica-
tion of agency principles. In the hypothetical that follows, without
the application of agency principles, the borrower is left with a much
weaker case and depending upon the jurisdiction, is not likely to re-
cover. However, if the hypothetical borrower can successfully argue
that the lender controlled and interfered with the borrower's business
through the lender's agents, the lender may be held liable by the
doctrine of respondeat superior under the definitions and concepts
provided in this article.
C. A Hypothetical Problem
Suppose a lender has made a sizable loan to a developer for the
construction of a hotel. The developer hires a general contractor and
32. Helen Davis Chaitman, The Equitable Subordination of Bank Claims, 39 Bus.
LAW. 1561, 1568-72 (1984).
33. See, e.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939); In re Mobile Steel Co., 563 F.2d
692, (5th Cir. 1977).
At least one author draws a distinction between "true" equitable subordination cases and
cases under the instrumentality or alter ego theories. Edward Mannino feels that in a true
equitable subordination case, the lender is not held responsible for any obligation of the debtor
other than its own. In such a case, a bankruptcy court merely subordinates the creditor, i.e.,
puts that creditor at the end of the payout line in response to the actions of that creditor. See,
e.g., EDWARD F. MANNINO, LENDER LIABILITY AND BANKING LITIGATION § 6.03[2], at 6-
12 (1992). This distinction is largely irrelevant for the purposes of this article; therefore, the
article uses the term "equitable subordination" merely to refer to any action by a competing
creditor, as opposed to an action brought against a lender directly by the borrower.
34. See, e.g., Swartz, supra note 2, at IA.
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begins the project. For a time, everything is fine, and the lender
promptly funds each draw requested by the developer. At some
point, the project falls behind schedule. Construction delay is typi-
cally a technical event of default as defined in most loan agreements.
The developer may also fail to provide updated financial statements,
another event of default under most construction loan agreements.
The lender, feeling insecure (whether reasonable or not), 5 in-
forms the borrower that it is dissatisfied with the present manage-
ment of the project. It points out that the loan is technically in de-
fault and threatens to foreclose the property unless the borrower
agrees to hire a specified individual in a high-ranking capacity, such
as Chief Financial Officer. This individual is to have complete au-
thority over the project. The borrower, afraid now that the project
may be lost if it does not comply, hires the identified individual, with
the lender actively participating in the negotiation of the employment
contract. The individual essentially takes over the project.
The individual does not receive any remuneration from the
lender. His or her salary and benefits are paid by the borrower. Of
course, this salary is covered by the borrower's draw requests, which
are funded by the lender. That is, if the loan does not fund, no em-
ployee of the borrower gets paid. The new-hire does not speak with
the lender on a daily basis and in general, attempts to run the project
in a profitable manner. Nevertheless, the individual makes decisions
that result in mechanic's liens and lawsuits being filed against the
borrower and other resultant defaults. The lender eventually decides
that it has had enough, accelerates all outstanding monies to be im-
mediately due and owing, and files a foreclosure action. The bor-
rower wishes to counterclaim under some type of lender liability the-
ory for the lender's seemingly wrongful interference and excessive
control. How the issues in this hypothetical would be resolved is un-
clear under the present agency precedents. Agency law is
archaic-with nary a treatise written in almost thirty years 36-and,
due to numerous convoluted opinions, agency law seems unable to
maintain precise definitions or enable one to predict legal outcomes
with any certainty.
This article advocates a simple solidification of these slippery
35. Depending upon the jurisdiction, lenders are under a good faith obligation of the
Uniform Commercial Code § 1-208 to "call" a loan and accelerate only when the lender
"reasonably" feels insecure. U.C.C. § 1-208 (1981); see Jeffrey A. Shapiro, Note, Illinois
Standard of Good Faith Under Section 1-208 of the U.C.C.: Watseka, First National Bank v.
Ruda Creates a Subjective Standard, 4 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 191 (1991).
36. See sources cited supra note 13.
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definitions and concepts, with the result that the above hypothetical
could be easily resolved by a factfinder. Quite simply, the individual
selected by the bank may be the lender's agent. If the individual is
the agent of the lender, he or she may further be a servant, a non-
servant, or a nonservant-independent contractor. The individual may
also be an independent contractor who bears no agency relationship
to the lender. The decision of which category to place the individual
in will depend upon the amount of control the lender exercises over
the individual at the inception of the relationship. Liability will then
be imputed to the lender through the concept of vicarious liability,
depending upon the precise nature of the wrongdoing engaged in by
the individual as applied to the tests that accompany each agency
definition. In other words, were the individual a servant, nearly any
act undertaken by the individual would impute liability.8" On the
other hand, were the individual a nonservant agent-independent con-
tractor, 8 the principal would only be liable for those acts that are
within the "inherent scope of the agency relationship." 9
This may not seem to be a radical view of agency law, and
indeed it is not. Nevertheless, the law and commentary on agency
leaves much of this analysis open to question. Hopefully, courts will
begin to adopt a more coherent framework of agency law that will
assist borrowers in their attempts to hold lenders liablefor the mis-
conduct of lender-appointed individuals who interfere with the bor-
rower's business and cause the borrower damages.
II. AGENCY FRAMEWORK AND DEFINITIONS
A. Establishment of an Agency Relationship
The creation of an agency relationship has three distinct ele-
ments. First, there must be a communication between the principal
and the agent and possibly, third parties. 0 Second, there must be
mutual assent to create the agency.4' And third, the parties must
37. See discussion infra part II.C.
38. Under the definitional structure provided in this article, an "independent contractor"
may or may not have an agency relationship with the other contracting party. Where an
agency relationship exists, the contractor is referred to as a "nonservant agent-independent
contractor."
39. See discussion infra part II.C.
40. Veeder v. NC Machinery Co., 720 F. Supp. 847, 848 (W.D. Wash. 1989); Good-
way Mktg. v. Faulkner Advertising Assocs., 545 F. Supp. 263, 266 (E.D. Pa. 1982); see also
WARREN A. SEAVEY, LAW OF AGENCY § 18 (1964).
41. AgriStor Leasing v. Bertholf, 753 F. Supp. 881, 892 (D. Kan. 1990); see Goodway
[Vol. 33
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understand that the principal controls the relationship.4
When the principal communicates to another person that the
person is to act on the principal's account and subject to the princi-
pal's orders, the principal satisfies the only element "required for
authority to do acts or conduct transactions" in an agency relation-
ship.43 "Authority to act as agent ... can be created in a great vari-
ety of ways; any conduct of the principal communicated directly or
indirectly to the agent is sufficient. Like offers of a contract, the in-
terpretation may result in an agency not intended by the
principal."44
Although an agency relationship is often created by a communi-
cation directly from the principal to the agent, it may also be created
by a communication between the principal and a third person.4
This is called "apparent authority.. 4  "There is apparent authority
to those who, relying upon conduct for which the principal is respon-
sible, reasonably believe in the existence of the authority. 4 7
Mktg., 545 F. Supp. at 266-67; SEAVEY, supra note 40, §§ 3, 18.
42. Goodway Mktg., Inc., 545 F. Supp. at 266-67; see SEAVEY, supra note 40, § 3, at 5.
43. Veeder, 720 F. Supp. at 848 (quoting SEAVEY, supra note 40, § 18); see Hayes v.
Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co., 899 F.2d 684, 687 (7th Cir. 1990) ("It is essential that there be some
form of communication, direct or indirect, by the principal .... "); Moreau v. James River-
Otis, Inc., 767 F.2d 6, 9-10 (1st Cir. 1985) (explaining that apparent authority "must be
established by proof of something said or done by the principal on which a third person rea-
sonably relied"); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8 (1958).
44. SEAVEY, supra note 40, § 18, at 33 (citing Lewis v. Cable, 107 F. Supp. 196 (W.D.
Pa. 1952); Lebanon Steel Foundry v. N.L.R.B., 130 F.2d 404 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 317
U.S. 659 (1942)); Central States Trucking Co. v. J.R. Simplot Co., 965 F.2d 431, 433 (7th
Cir. 1992) (citing American Broadcasting Co. v. Climate Control Corp., 524 F. Supp. 1014,
1017 (N.D. Ill. 1981) ("[An agency relationship does not necessarily depend on an express
appointment and acceptance thereof, but may be implied from the circumstances of the
case.")); Upchurch v. Henderson, 505 N.E.2d 455, 457 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (recognizing that
an agency relationship may be implied circumstantially).
45. SEAVEY, supra note 40, § 18, at 33.
46. Id. § 18, at 33-34; see, e.g., Essex Crane Rental Corp. v. Weyher/Livesey Con-
structors, 940 F.2d 1253, 1257 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that it is essential that there is a
communication by the principal that instills a reasonable belief in the mind of a third party);
Todd Farm Corp. v. Navistar Int'l Corp., 835 F.2d 1253, 1256 (8th Cir. 1987) (explaining
that apparent authority would have existed if the principal had acted in a manner that would
lead to a reasonable belief that the agent had authority to act on the principal's behalf).
47. SEAVEY, supra note 40, § 18, at 33 (citing Hartley v. United Mine Workers, 113
A.2d 239 (Pa. 1955)); see also Damian Serv. Corp. v. PLC Serv., 763 F. Supp. 369, 372-73
(N.D. Ill. 1991) (explaining that apparent authority must be based on acts or statements of
principal); Electro Battery Mfg. Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 762 F. Supp. 844, 851
(E.D. Mo. 1991) (explaining that apparent authority may be created where principal places
agent in situation where a reasonable person would believe the agent is authorized to act);
Cugnini v. Reynolds Cattle Co., 648 P.2d 159, 164 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981); Spence, Payne,
Masington & Grossman v. Gerson, 483 So.2d 775, 777 (Fla. Ct. App. 1986); Good v. Fisk,
524 So.2d 203, 205 (La. Ct. App. 1988); Homa v. Friendly Mobile Manor, 612 A.2d 322
1993]
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Placing an individual into a position in which the acts or repre-
sentations of that individual would appear reasonable to a third
party is sufficient to create an agency relationship.4" On the other
hand, the statements of an individual regarding his or her authority
are inadmissible as evidence of his or her authority unless he or she
was in fact authorized to make such statements.4
In addition to a communication, an agent must accept what
amounts to an offer by the principal. 50 This is akin to the contract
concept of "mutual assent."'" Agency requires consent of both the
agent and the principal." However, regardless of how the parties
define their relationship, and even if both deny the existence of the
relationship, an agency will be found to exist when the evidence in-
dicates one.53
The most critical element in the creation of an agency is that
the parties understand that the principal is to be in control of the
undertaking.54 Control defines whether the principal may be simul-
taneously described as a "master."55 The element of control is not
relevant to the question of whether a principal is liable for the acts
(Md. Ct. App. 1992); Jefferson-Gravois Bank v. Cunningham, 674 S.W.2d 561, 563 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1984).
48. See Electro-Battery Mfg. Co., 762 F. Supp. at 851.
49. SEAVEY, supra note 40, § 18, at 34, (citing Allen v. San Francisco Wholesale Dairy
Produce Exch., 210 P. 41 (Cal. App. Ct. 1922)); see also Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S.
171, 189 (1987) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 285 (1958)); Mackey v.
Burke, 751 F.2d 322, 326 n.3 (10th Cir. 1984); Swank, Inc. v. Carmona, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1067, 1069 (D.P.R. 1986). However, an agent's statements may be admissible as cor-
roboration of other evidence tending to prove the agency relationship. Braniff Airways, v. Mid-
west Corp., 873 F.2d 805, 808 (5th Cir. 1989).
50. See Sutton v. Sanders, 556 N.E.2d 1362, 1365 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990).
51. Woolley v. Embassy Suites, 278 Cal. Rptr 719, 724 (Ct. App. 1991); see SEAVEY,
supra note 40, § 3, at 3-4.
52. E.g., Todd Farm Corp. v. Navistar Int'l Corp., 835 F.2d 1253, 1256 (8th Cir.
1987) (citing Kanzmeier v. McCoppin, 398 N.W.2d 826, 830 (Iowa 1987)); American Broad-
casting Co. v. Climate Control Corp., 524 F. Supp. 1014, 1016 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Woodward &
Dickerson, Inc. v. Yoo Hoo Beverage Co., 502 F. Supp. 395, 406 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Chariton
Feed & Grain v. Harder, 369 N.W.2d 777, 789-90 (Iowa 1985) (en banc).
53. Dutton v. International Harvester Co., 504 N.E.2d 313, 317 & n.2 (Ind. Ct. App.
1987); SEAVEY, supra note 40, § 18, at 33 (citing Home Fed. Say. & Loan v. Peerless Ins.,
197 F. Supp. 428 (N.D. Iowa 1961)).
54. E.g., Morgan v. Kobrin Sec., Inc., 649 F. Supp. 1023, 1032-33 (N.D. Il. 1986);
Mendise v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Plan, 80 Lab. Cas. (CCH) V 11, 887
(N.D. Ohio 1975); Smith v. Crown Zellerbach, 486 So.2d 798, 801 (La. App. Ct.), writ de-
nied, 489 So.2d 246 (La. 1986); see also 2A C.J.S. Agency § 36 (1972). For a a complete
analysis of the issue of control, see discussion infra part II.C.2.b.
55. REUSCHLEIN & GREGORY, supra note 13, at 3. Note that the distinction between
'master" and "principal" is now largely irrelevant. 3 AM. JUR. 2D Agency § 280 (1986); see
discussion infra part II.C.2.a.
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of an agent nor is the element of control necessary to prove the ongo-
ing agency relationship.56 The concept of control is only relevant at
the inception of the relationship to determine whether an agency re-
lationship exists at all, and if so, whether the agent will be defined
as an agent, a servant, or an independent contractor.57
Agency may also be further broken down into two sub-defini-
tions of "general agent" and "special agent." A general agent is au-
thorized to conduct an ongoing series of transactions to further the
interests of the principal.5" A special agent, on the other hand, is
only authorized to conduct a single transaction "or a series of trans-
actions not involving continuity of service."159
This distinction is important because while the principal may
not be held liable for the unauthorized acts of a special agent, 60 the
principal will remain liable for acts of a general agent, even when
unauthorized, so long as those acts are "acts which general agents
usually perform."'" This power is referred to as "inherent agency
power."62 The scope and extent of the agency are determined by the
intentions of the parties and by the circumstances surrounding the
relationship.6" These topics are discussed later in this article.6 '
56. See infra text accompanying notes 57-76.
57. Cf. Third Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 548 F.2d 166, 170
(6th Cir. 1977) (explaining that the mode and manner of control must be examined to define a
relationship as principal and agent or master and servant as opposed to employer and indepen-
dent contractor).
58. City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 172 n.22 (1988) (Steven, J., dissent-
ing); Flintridge Station Assocs. v. American Fletcher Mortg. Co., 761 F.2d 434, 439 (7th Cir.
1985); Donroy, Ltd. v. United States, 301 F.2d 200, 205 (9th Cir. 1962); Anthony P. Miller,
Inc. v. Needham, 122 F.2d 710, 712 (3d Cir. 1941); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 3 cmt. c (1958); REUSCHLEIN & GREGORY, supra note 13, at 14.
59. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 3 (1958); see Voorhees-Jontz Lumber Co.
v. Bezek, 209 N.E.2d 380, 387 (Ind. Ct. App. 1965).
60. Voorhees-Jontz Lumber Co., 209 N.E.2d at 387.
61. REUSCHLEIN & GREGORY, supra note 13, at 15; see Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Coffin, 186 N.E.2d 180, 182-83 (Ind. Ct. App. 1962).
62. REUSCHLEIN & GREGORY, supra note 13, at 15. The Restatement defines "inherent
agency power" as follows:
Inherent agency power is a term used in the restatement of this subject to
indicate the power of an agent which is derived not from apparent authority, or
estoppel, but solely from the agency relation and exists for the protection of
persons harmed by or dealing with a servant or other agent.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8A (1958). Reuschlein and Gregory indicate that
"[tlhe term has since been rather widely used to explain the liability saddled upon the princi-
pal in those cases where the agent involved in a transaction had neither authority nor apparent
authority and the court could not find the elements of estoppel." REUSCHLEIN & GREGORY,
supra note 13, at 15 n.31.
63. Minnesota Farm Bureau Mktg. Corp. v. North Dakota Agric. Mktg. Ass'n, Inc.,
563 F.2d 906, 909 n.2 (8th Cir. 1977) (quoting Leonard v. North Dakota Co-operative Wool
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Although many elements of the agency relationship mirror those
required for a valid contractual relationship (offer, acceptance and
mutual assent), there is one key difference: No consideration is nec-
essary for the creation of an agency relationship." "One who volun-
tarily acts at the direction of another is an agent, although nothing
is received by the actor.'
B. Continuation or Termination of the Relationship
Once an agency is shown to exist, that agency will be presumed
to continue until proven otherwise.67 Agency can be proven to have
been terminated either expressly, as where notice is given by the
principal to the agent that the agency is terminated,68 or implicitly,
such as when the undertaking is obviously complete and the agent
should know that the principal no longer wishes him to act. 9
1. Express Termination
A principal may terminate the agency relationship by revoking
the agent's power to act.7" Such a revocation must be expressly made
known to the agent."
2. Implicit Termination
"As in the making of an offer, authority is created by a unilat-
eral act and continues to exist as long as the one upon whom it is
conferred has reason to believe the other desires him to act, if the
other retains capacity."7 2 The agency relationship will usually termi-
Mktg. Ass'n, 6 N.W.2d 576, 578 (N.D. 1942)); White Oak Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers
of America, 318 F.2d 591, 600 (6th Cir. 1963).
64. See discussion infra part II.C.2.c.
65. 53 AM. JUR. 2D Master and Servant § 18 (1970).
66. ARTHUR D. WOLFE & FREDERICK J. NAFFZIGER, LEGAL PERSPECTIVES OF
AMERICAN BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 60 (1977).
67. Boggs v. McMickle, 206 P.2d 824, 825 (Colo. 1949) (reasonable time); National.
Park Bank v. Concordia Land & Timber Co., 97 So. 272, 277 (La. 1922) (demonstrating the
presumption of a continuing agency overcome by a contrary presumption).
68. E.g., Van Houten v. Trust Co., 109 N.E.2d 187, 189 (Ill. 1952).
69. See, e.g, id.; Jefferson Trust & Savings Bank v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 325
N.E.2d 384, 387 (Il1. Ct. App. 1975).
70. SEAVEY supra note 40, § 46, at 87; WOLFE & NAFFZIGER, supra note 66, at 182;
Leona Beane, Terminating an Agent's Authority-Is Notice Required?, 19 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 181, 181 (1983).
71. SEAVEY, supra note 40, § 46, at 88. Although an agency relationship may be for-
mally terminated, liability of the principal may continue for the apparent authority of the
agent unless the principal also notifies third parties of the termination. Id. § 51, at 94.
72. Id. § 18, at 33.
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nate when the agent should realize that the principal does not wish
for the agent to act on the principal's behalf any longer, or, if the
principal knew the facts, would no longer wish the agent to act on
the principal's behalf. 8 The agency relationship will also terminate
upon completion of the "undertaking." '74 Lapse of time may also act
to terminate an agency relationship.7" However, termination by lapse
of time is highly dependent upon the type of transaction involved.
Additionally, an agency relationship may terminate if there is a
change in circumstances such that the agent should be aware that the
principal no longer wishes the agent to act. 76
The continued existence of the agency relationship is a prelimi-
nary fact that will be assumed by the court unless proven other-
wise. 77 Just because the agency relationship continues to exist, how-
ever, does not mean that the principal will therefore be liable for all
the acts of the agent.7 ' Rather, the doctrine of respondeat superior
must be applied to determine whether the principal will be liable.79
As we shall see, where the existence of the agency relation turns
primarily upon the control of the principal over the agent, the impu-
tation of liability turns primarily upon whether the actions of the
agent are within the scope of the employment."0
C. Vicarious Liability and Respondeat Superior
"Looking for a 'deep pocket'? If so, you may be in luck.", 1
The first step in analyzing the concept of vicarious liability
must be to compartmentalize agency law and the liability of a princi-
pal for the acts of an agent into the categories of contract liability or
tort liability. While the standards by which a principal's liability
will be imputed overlap, it is useful to consider each basis of liability
separately.
73. Id. § 42, at 81.
74. Id. § 42, at 82.
75. Id. § 44, at 83.
76. Id. § 45, at 84.
77. Ensign Fin. Corp. v. FDIC, 785 F. Supp. 391, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
78. See, e.g., Brady v. Roosevelt S.S. Co., 317 U.S. 575, 581 (1943) ("The principal is
not liable for every negligent act of his agent.").
79. 53 Am. JUR. 2D Master and Servant § 417 (1970).
80. See discussion infra part II.C.2.c.
81. Kenneth W. Curtis, Comment, The Fiduciary Controversy: Injection of Fiduciary
Principles into the Bank-Depositor and Bank-Borrower Relationships, 20 Loy. L.A. L. REV.
795, 795 (1987).
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1. Contract Liability
When a question is presented in which a third party wishes to
hold the principal liable for a contract that was executed by the
agent, the court will examine the actual or apparent authority of the
agent.82 The general rule is that for the principal to be held liable
for such contracts, the contract must have been entered into on the
principal's behalf, and the contract must be within the actual or ap-
parent authority of the agent.8"
a. Actual Authority
Actual authority can be broken down into express authority and
implied authority.8' Obviously, a principal may expressly communi-
cate to an agent that the agent has the power to take a specific ac-
tion. The agent here has actual and express authority. But in a com-
mercial setting it will be impossible for the principal to express all of
the kinds of authority the agent will need to complete the required
task. Therefore, implied authority is said to exist.
Implied authority is found by examining the facts of the partic-
ular case, defining the expressed authority and then asking
whether or not a reasonable person familiar with the customs
and ways of dealings of agents in the particular line of business
could believe that the agent had the authority to act. 85
Implied authority is, therefore, a subset of actual authority and can
only exist if it is reasonably necessary to carry out the expressed
objective for which actual authority was granted.86
b. Circumstantial Authority
A second category of authority can be described as "circumstan-
tial authority," which can be broken down further into "apparent
authority," "estoppel," and "inherent authority. '87 "[C]ircumstantial
82. See, e.g., Pasco County Peach Ass'n v. J.F. Solley & Co., 146 F.2d 880, 883 (4th
Cir. 1945); Scripps v. Smith, Hague & Co., 679 F. Supp 676, 678 (E.D. Mich. 1988).
83. See, e.g., Beckenstein v. Potter & Carrier, Inc., 464 A.2d 6, 13-14 (Conn. Super. Ct.
1983); Feeley v. Accident Fund, 484 N.W.2d 707, 709 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992); Olvera v.
Charles Z. Flack Agency, Inc., 415 S.E.2d 760, 763 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992); Pee Dee Nursing
Home v. Florence Gen. Hosp., 419 S.E.2d 834, 835 (S.C. Ct. App. 1992); Baggett v. Crown
Automotive Group, No. 01-A-9110-CV-00401, 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 464, at *22 (May
22, 1992).
83. WOLFE & NAFFZIGER, supra note 66, at 84.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 90.
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authority is defined by asking what measure of authority could a
third party reasonably believe the agent to have under the circum-
stances."88 The Restatement defines "apparent authority" as "the
power to affect the legal relations of another person by transactions
with third [parties], professedly as agent for the other, arising from
and in accordance with the others manifestations to such third
[party]." 89 Thus, there are two required elements for apparent au-
thority to exist. First, circumstances must be created by the principal
that could reasonably result in a third party believing that the agent
is authorized. ° Second, there must be actual and reasonable reliance
by the third party upon these circumstances. 1
In some cases the doctrine of estoppel applies to bar the princi-
pal from denying liability for the contracts of the agent. "[E]stoppel
is appropriately argued when there have been: 1.) circumstances cre-
ated by the principal which 2.) cause a third-party to reasonably
believe the agent has authority (these two elements are identical to
the elements for apparent authority) and 3.) the third-party has
changed his position." 92 An agency by estoppel occurs if a principal
communicates solely with the agent in terminating the agent's au-
thority, and the principal fails to inform third parties.9 '
"Inherent agency power is a term used in the Restatement to
indicate the power of an agent which is derived not from authority,
apparent authority or estoppel, but solely from the agency relation
and exists for the protection of persons harmed by or dealing with..
• an agent." '94 The common law developed the law of inherent au-
thority to apply in situations such as where a "breach of duty may
look like one of the generally recognized torts but it is not."9 This
stems from a belief that it would be unfair for a corporation to ob-
tain the benefits of agency law without bearing the responsibility for
the agent's acts.96 "The doctrine of inherent authority is another ex-
ample of courts' recognition that it is vital to protect the reasonable
88. Id.
89. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8 cmt. (1958).
90. See WOLFE & NAFFZIGER, supra note 66, at 90.
91. See id.
92. Id. at 91.
93. Treadwell Ford, Inc. v. Wallace, 271 So.2d 505, 511 (Ala. Ct. App. 1973); see also
1 FLOYD R. MECHEM, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF AGENCY § 632 (1914); JOSEPH STORY,
LAW OF AGENCY § 470 at 583-84 (9th ed. 1882); Beane, supra note 70, at 182.
94. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8A cmt. (1958).
95. WOLFE & NAFFZIGER, supra note 66, at 97.
96. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8A at 36-37 cmt. (1958).
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expectations of businessmen."'97 "Inherent authority may exist when
the principal has expressly forbidden the agent to act in certain mat-
ters, yet failed to take measures to inform third parties of this limita-
tion causing them to reasonably believe the position of the agent car-
ried with it the authority asserted.""8
A party may argue in any given factual situation that all three
of the circumstantial authority concepts-apparent, estoppel, and in-
herent-apply at the same time. "There is no inconsistency in
this." 99
2. Tort Liability
"Respondeat superior"100 is the term used to describe the liabil-
ity of a principal for the unauthorized or disobedient acts of an agent
when those acts are conducted in connection with the interests of the
principal. 10 "The well-settled general rule is that a principal is lia-
ble civilly for the tortious acts of his agent which are done within the
course and scope of the agent's employment. '"02 A principal may be
liable for the tort of an agent when the principal has created a situa-
tion that allows the agent to commit the tort.10 3 This is aggravated
(or enhanced) when the agent commits the tort with the intention of
furthering the interests of the principal." '
a. Master, Servant and Independent Contractor:
What Is the Relationship?105
A distinction in terms is often found in agency cases. The terms
97. WOLFE & NAFFZIGER, supra note 66, at 98.
98. Id.; see also Steven A. Fishman, Inherent Agency Power-Should Enterprise Lia-
bility Apply to Agents' Unauthorized Contracts?, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 3-4 (1987).
99. WOLFE & NAFFZIGER, supra note 66, at 98.
100. "Let the master answer." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1311-12 (6th ed. 1990).
101. Pearson v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 332 F.2d 439, 442 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 914 (1964).
102. 3 AM. JUR. 2D Agency § 280 (1986); see Estate of Mathes v. Ireland, 419 N.E.2d
782, 786 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) ("IT]he touchstone for the principal's liability for the tortious
acts of his agent is merely whether they are done within the course and scope of the
employment.").
103. SEAVEY, supra note 40, § 87, at 148.
104. Id.
105. "When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said in a scornful tone, "it means
just what I choose it to mean-neither more nor less."
"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make the words mean so many
different things."
"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is the master-that's all."
LEWIS CARROLL., THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS (1977).
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"master and servant" are often seen along with "principal and
agent."106 In some English cases, the distinction among terms was
based upon the amount of control the master or principal held over
the servant or agent." 7 However, this distinction has not generally
been maintained, thus, allowing the categories of agents and servants
to be coextensive as far as the question of control by the employer is
concerned.'0 8 There is no difference in the liability of a principal for
the tortious act of an agent and a master for the tortious act of the
servant.'09 "In both cases, the tort liability is based on the master
and servant, rather than agency, principle . "..."110 In other words,
although control is relevant for establishing the relationship, the
question of liability will turn upon whether the agent or servant was
acting in the scope of his or her employment."'
The Restatement defines "master and servant" as a subset of
"principal and agent.""'  Despite the legal insignificance of the dif-
ference in terms, some cases and commentators continue to draw a
limited distinction. Seavey defines a "servant" as "one who gives per-
sonal service as a member of a business or domestic household, and
subject to control by the employer as to his physical activities.""'  He
also cautions that this statement cannot give an "accurate picture" of
106. See, e.g., Merton Ferson, Bases for Master's Liability and for Principal's Liability
to Third Persons, 4 VAND. L. REV. 260 (1951).
107. 3 Am. JUR. 2D Agency § 280 (1986); see also Harold J. Laski, The Basis of Vica-
rious Liability, 26 YALE L.J. 105, 114 (1916) (discussing the "private policeman" theory).
108. 3 AM. JUR. 2D Agency § 280 (1986); see also Alfred Conard, What's Wrong with
Agency?, I J. LEGAL EDUC. 540, 553-54 (1949) (discussing the debate over whether "ser-
vants" should be a subcategory of "agents" in drafting the Restatement).
109. 3 AM. JUR. 2D Agency § 280 (1986).
110. Id.
111. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 212-19 (1958).
112. This definition is as follows:
1. A master is a principal who employs an agent to perform service in his af-
fairs and who controls or has the right to control the physical conduct of the
other in the performance of the service.
2. A servant is an agent employed by a master to perform service in his affairs
whose physical conduct in the performance of the service is controlled or is sub-
ject to the right of control by the master.
3. An independent contractor is a person who contracts with another to do
something for him but who is not controlled by the other nor subject to the
other's right of control with respect to his physical conduct in the performance
of the undertaking. He may or may not be an agent.
Id. at § 2; accord, WOLFE & NAFFZIGER, supra note 66, at 125.
113. SEAVEY, supra note 40, § 84, at 141 (citing Roscoe T. Steffen, The Independent
Contractor and the Good Life, 2 U. CHL L. REV. 501 (1935)); see Joseph M. Jacobs, Are
Independent Contractors Really Independent, 3 DEPAUL L. REV. 23, 43 (1953); Paul A.
Leidy, Salesmen As Independent Contractors, 28 MicH. L. REV. 365, 368-73 (1930).
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what the courts mean when they use the term. 1 4 The distinction is
relevant for negligent physical acts of an agent, for which the princi-
pal will not ordinarily be liable.11 5 However, the principal will be
liable for the negligent physical acts of a servant." 6 A distinction is
often drawn by examining the task with which the agent is assigned.
A servant sells or gives time, while a nonservant agent is paid for a
result." 7
A principal is liable to third persons for the other torts of any
agent, whether or not a servant; (a) if the act was authorized,
or, as to one relying upon the relation, was apparently author-
ized; or (b) if the tort was committed within the agent's inherent
powers; or (c) if the agent's position enabled him to commit the
tort.""
Thus, on this analysis, the servant-agent distinction is only relevant
where the principal is to be held liable for a physical injury caused
by the servant or agent.
1 1 9
However, in Green v. Perry,2' the court held that no respon-
deat superior liability exists for tortious acts committed by "non-
servant agents." ' 1 In Green, the plaintiff was a delivery man for the
co-defendant company.' The co-defendant Perry was also a deliv-
ery man for the company. 2  The company asked Perry to drive
Green home one day after work in a company van.1" Perry did so,
and on the way home he was involved in an accident in which Green
114. SEAVEY, supra note 40, § 84, at 141.
115. Blanchard v. Ogima, 215 So.2d 902, 906 (La. 1968) (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 250 (1958)).
116. Juarbe v. Philadelphia, 431 A.2d 1073, 1076 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981).
117. SEAVEY, supra note 40, § 84, at 142.
118. Id. § 91, at 161.
119. See, e.g., Levy v. Senofonte, 204 A.2d 420, 425 n.13 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1964)
(finding no liability for negligence of nonservant agent); Marco v. County, 578 N.E.2d 579,
582 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (Reinhard, J., concurring) (principal not responsible for physical
harm caused by nonservant agent's negligence); Burkett v. Crulo Trucking Co., 355 N.E.2d
253, 261 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976) (deciding that no liability will be imputed where nonservant
agent causes harm by physical negligence); Traders & General Ins. Co. v. Robinson, 289
So.2d 178, 187 (La. Ct. App. 1973) (negligence of nonservant agent may not be imputed to
principal); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 250 (1958); 3 AM. JUR. 2D
Agency § 280, at 784 (1986).
120. Green v. Perry, 549 N.E.2d 385 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990).
121. Id. at 389 (citing Burkett v. Crulo Trucking Co., 355 N.E.2d 253 (Ind. Ct. App.
1976)).
122. d. at 386.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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was injured.' 25 Green argued that Perry was an employee of the
company and that the company was, therefore, responsible for
Perry's tortious actions. 2 ' The company argued that Perry was an
independent contractor and that they were, therefore, not responsible
for his actions.12
7
The court began with a correct analysis of the law of respon-
deat superior.'12 That is, the court demonstrated that is was looking
for the degree of control over Perry by the company to decide
whether or not an agency relationship existed: "Control is the key
factor in determining the existence of an employment relationship.
Control means direction and control over the employee's work; how-
ever, control refers to the right to control, rather than its actual exer-
cise. 129 The court even went so far as to recognize that an "inde-
pendent contractor" may also share an "employment relationship"
with the company such that the company would be liable for the
torts of the independent contractor.'3 ° "While parties may be desig-
nated as 'independent contractors,' as opposed to 'employees,' an em-
ployer-employee relationship may still be found if enough of the in-
dicia of an employment relationship exists."'' 3
The company did not pay Perry a salary or hourly wage,
rather, he was paid by the job.'32 No taxes or social security were
withheld, and no benefits were provided.' On this evidence, the
court held that it was undisputed Perry was an independent contrac-
tor.'"4 However, there was also evidence that Perry had just accepted
a position with the company as a sales representative.' 35 As a sales
representative, Perry would be paid on a per-day basis, would re-
ceive benefits, and would have his expenses paid. This raises an in-
ference of a "master-servant" relationship, according to the court.""
The court wrote that "[t]here is no respondeat superior liability for
principals whose non-servant agents commit tortious acts.' 37 This
125. Id.
126. Id. at 387.
127. Id. Note that the Restatement provides that an independent contractor may simul-
taneously be an agent. See definition supra note 112.
128. Green, 549 N.E.2d at 387.
129. Id. (citing Swanson v. Wabash College, 504 N.E.2d 327 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987)).
130. Id.
131. Id. (citing Furr v. Review Board, 482 N.E.2d 790 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985)).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 389 (citing Burkett v. Crulo Trucking Co., 355 N.E.2d 253 (Ind. Ct. App.
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language is unfortunate and inappropriate.
Upon analysis, Green may have been using incorrect designa-
tions. That is, what Green refers to as a "nonservant agent" may
actually be an independent contractor who has no agency relation-
ship with the other contracting party. In fact, it is clear that Green
correctly analyzed the problem, for in the next paragraph the court
comments: "If the Greens are to prevail on their claim, they must
establish a master-servant relationship whether that be as employer-
employee, master-gratuitous servant, or principal-agent. There is
no free-standing theory of relief based upon an agency relation-
ship."" 8 Unilaterally stating that no liability can attach for a "non-
servant agent" is a mistake. This mistake was made in the earlier
case of Burkett v. Crulo Trucking Co., ' where the court referred to
a "nonservant agent" as an "independent contractor" without realiz-
ing the distinction between the two.140 Green relied on Burkett in
making its erroneous statement.""'
The Burkett case did not lead to an inconsistent result because
in that case the "nonservant agent" had caused a harm through
physical negligence. 42 In Burkett, the plaintiff's decedent was killed
when he was rear-ended by a dump truck owned by the defend-
ant. 43 The driver of the dump truck leased it from the company and
then hauled stone for the company.""' At the time of the accident,
the defendant was on his way to pick up a load of stone for the
company.' 5 The issue was, therefore, whether the company should
be held liable for the driver's tort.' 4 6
The Burkett court recognized at the outset that "[t]here is a
semantic problem."'1 4 7 Unfortunately, Burkett does not resolve the
problem but only makes it worse.
Employees, servants, and independent contractors, as well as
other categories of persons, may, in the proper circumstances, be
described as agents. Professor Seavey classifies all agents as ei-
ther servants or non-servants and designates the latter as a type
1976)).
138. Id. (emphasis added).
139. Burkett v. Crulo Trucking Co., 355 N.E.2d 253 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976).
140. Id. at 261.
141. Green, 549 N.E.2d at 389.
142. Burkett, 355 N.E.2d at 253.
143. Id. at 254.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 258.
147. Id. at 261.
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of independent contractor. While "employee" and "servant"
may have variant connotations, modern case law tends to treat
the words as virtually synonymous in agency applications. Al-
though Burkett seems to view "agent" and "independent con-
tractor" as mutually exclusive descriptions, they are not. An in-
dependent contractor may well be an agent.148
This passage from the Burkett decision correctly states the law. The
Burkett court makes its mistake in applying its own recognition of
the somewhat "liquid" definitions. The court holds that "nonservant
agent" and "independent contractor" are synonymous and that re-
spondeat superior will not impute liability to a principal for such a
person's acts.149 The court recognized that Professor Seavey defines
nonservant agents as "a type of" independent contractor.1 "' How-
ever, this does not mean that all independent contractors are non-
servant agents. More importantly, even an independent contractor
can subject the principal to liability if the principal exhibits enough
control over the contractor's actions.151
The cases and commentary indicate that a principal may be
held responsible for the acts of an independent contractor. 52 Some-
times the terms "nonservant agent" and "independent contractor"
overlap, and whether or not liability for the acts of such a person
exists depends upon whether the tort was committed within the in-
herent scope of the employment. 5 ' This was the deficiency in Bur-
kett. The Burkett court did not consider the scope of employment
issue. The Burkett court made the mistake of deciding that once an
agent was defined as a "nonservant," that made the agent an "inde-
pendent contractor," and that was the end of the story-no further
analysis was required. Burkett should have decided that once the
agent was classified as a "nonservant" or "independent contractor,"
the principal would only be liable for acts committed during the
scope of employment, with the existence of such employment depend-
ing upon the right to control.
The most important distinction is between an agent and an in-
dependent contractor who is not also acting as an agent.1 54 Principals
148. Id. (citation omitted) (citing SEAVEY, supra note 40, § 6).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. See SEAVEY, supra note 40, § 82, at 137-40.
152. See id.
153. See WOLFE & NAFFZIGER, supra note 66, at 129.
154. As mentioned earlier, these concepts may overlap. This is consistent with the defi-
nition of an independent contractor found in the Restatement, which provides that an indepen-
dent contractor may or may not be an agent. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2
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are generally not responsible for the acts of an independent contrac-
tor.15 "One who employs an independent contractor suffers no lia-
bility based upon respondeat superior for this agent's torts!""8 6 "An
independent contractor agrees to accomplish certain results . . ., but
such contractor is not controlled in the details, manner, or particular
method of performing the task. An agent, on the other hand, is sub-
ject to the control of the principal with respect to the details of the
work."' 57 Thus, in determining whether a relationship is based upon
agency or independent contract, the court must inquire as to the con-
trol of the principal over the other party.
It is the "right to control" that is most significant in determin-
ing whether the relationship is one based upon agency or indepen-
dent contract." 8 Here again, as with the distinction between agent
and servant, the "control" element is only relevant to establish the
relationship, not to impose liability. Once the relationship is deter-
mined to be an agency relationship, the scope of employment deter-
mines liability. If the control element is considered and found insuffi-
cient to support an agency relationship, then the "agent" is actually
an independent contractor, and the principal will not ordinarily be
liable for his or her acts. However, an independent contractor may
still be an agent. While this confuses the terms, and as Burkett aptly
recognized: "There is a semantics problem,"'' the analysis never-
theless remains the same. Step one is whether there is a right to
control. Step two is whether the action was in the scope of employ-
ment. If both steps are satisfied, then the principal will be liable
whether the relationship is deemed an agency or an independent
contractor. In other words, how a court labels the relationship is less
important than the analysis in which the court engages.
(1958); accord WOLFE & NAFFZIGER, supra note 66, at 125-30.
155. A principal may be held liable for the actions of the independent contractor if the
activity engaged in was ultrahazardous or if the principal exercised control and direction over
the contractor. See WOLFE & NAFFZIGER, supra note 66, at 125-30.
156. Id. at 126.
157. Western Adjustment & Inspection Co. v. Gross Income Tax Div., 142 N.E.2d 630,
634 (Ind. 1957).
158. See Oberlin v. Marlin Am. Corp., 596 F.2d 1322, 1326-27 (7th Cir. 1979); E.I.
DuPont De Nemours & Co. v. I.D. Griffith, Inc., 130 A.2d 783, 786 (Del. 1957); Mernick v.
Chiodini, 139 N.E.2d 784, 788 (Il1. App. Ct. 1956); Maxwell v. Bernard, 343 So.2d 431, 433
(La. Ct. App. 1977); Bolin v. Scheurer, 297 N.W. 106, 107 (Minn. 1941); Texas Co. v.
Zeigler, 14 S.E.2d 704, 707 (Va. 1941); see also infra part II.C.2.b for an in-depth analysis of
the "control" issue.
159. See supra text accompanying note 147.
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b. How Much Control Is Necessary for the Acts of the
Agent to Bind the Principal?
The right to control is the key to finding an agency relationship
from which liability may be imputed under the doctrine of respon-
deat superior.60 The right to control must exist for the creation of
an agency relationship, and an agency relationship must exist for
liability to be imputed under the doctrine of respondeat superior.16'
Bear in mind that actual control need not be shown. It is the
existence of the right to control that will result in a characterization
of the relationship as one of principal and agent. As one commenta-
tor has stated:
Though "control" is an important factor, and in some cases still
a decisive factor, it is wrong to overestimate its value. Further-
more, in applying the control test, the question is not whether
in practice the work was done subject to a direction and control
exercised by an actual supervision or whether an actual supervi-
sion was possible, but whether ultimate authority over the man
in the performance of his work resided in the employer so that
he was subject to the employer's orders and directions. 6 '
In determining whether the principal has employed an agent
who will act on the principal's behalf and subject the principal to
liability or an independent contractor who will not, the Restatement
has provided courts with four considerations:
1. The extent of control the principal may exercise over the de-
tails of the agent's work;
2. Whether or not the agent is engaged in a generally recog-
nized occupation of his own in which he exercises his own inde-
pendent skill and judgment;
3. Whether the principal or the agent supplies the instrumental-
ities, tools and place of work; and
4. The method of payment, whether by time or by the job. 68
Thus, it can be said that generally if the action to be taken is to
160. It is merely the right to control and not actual control that is essential. Liability
may still be found even if the principal exercised no control whatsoever, so long as the princi-
pal had the right to control the agent. SEAVEY, supra note 40, § 84, at 142.
161. See e.g., Carver v. Crawford, 564 N.E.2d 330, 334 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990); Delk v.
Board of Comm'rs, 503 N.E.2d 436, 440 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987).
162. William H. Dickey, Jr., "You Can Trust Your Car to the Man Who Wears the
Star"-or Can You? The Use of Apparent Authority to Establish a Principal's Tort Liability,
33 U. PiTT. L. REV. 257, 259 (1971) (quoting JR. Carly-Hall, Contract of Services, Con-
tract for Services: The Modern Theories-I, 113 SOLIC. J. 356 (1969)).
163. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (1958).
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accomplish a physical result, such as painting a house, and the prin-
cipal is to direct the work, then a master-servant relationship exists.
If, however, the actions to be taken are more abstract, such as "nego-
tiating, contracting, auditing, etc., then chances are that a principal-
independent contractor relationship exists."16
For example, in most service station cases the service station
operator is held to be an independent contractor and not an agent of
the oil company.' 6 5 In Smith v. Cities Service Oil Co.,' a typical
case, the operator purchased supplies from other suppliers from
which the oil company received no profit, fixed the hours of the sta-
tion, hired his own attendants, fixed the salaries and conditions of
employment, and kept his own books and records.'67 The only indi-
cia of an agency relationship was that the defendant's brand signs
were displayed, the operator accepted the defendant's credit cards,
and from time to time the defendant suggested methods for the oper-
ation of the station. 66 The court found that this did not amount to
an agency relationship.'69 This is to be distinguished from Gizzi v.
Texaco, Inc.,' ° wherein the court found the oil company held itself
out to the public as vouching for the abilities of the operator's
mechanics and, thereby, exposing itself to liability on an "apparent
authority" agency relationship. 7'
Cases such as Green and Burkett indicated that there was no
distinction and that if a person was an independent contractor or
nonservant agent, there could be no liability based upon respondeat
superior.7 Wolfe and Naffziger indicate that this may not be true
164. WOLFE & NAFFZIGER, supra note 66, at 126.
165. See, e.g., Smith v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 346 F.2d 349 (7th Cir. 1965); Texas Co. v.
Higgins, 118 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1941); Nelson v. Cities Sery. Oil Co., 146 N.W.2d 261 (Iowa
1966); Reynolds v. Skelly Oil Co., 287 N.W. 823 (Iowa 1939).
166. Smith v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 346 F.2d 349 (7th Cir. 1965).
167. Id. at 352.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Gizzi v. Texaco, Inc., 437 F.2d 308 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 829 (1971).
171. See id. at 310; Dickey, supra note 162, at 257; see also Lafayette Bank & Trust
Co. v. Price, 440 N.E.2d 759, 761-62 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982).
172. Commentators indicate that in a lender-borrower control relationship there will
"rarely, if ever, be a master-servant relationship. Few creditors will immerse themselves so
deeply into the debtor's business that they exercise actual physical control. The controlling
creditor may be able to characterize the relationship as an 'independent contractor-agency' and
thereby avoid compensating the debtor's tort victims." Dan S. Schechter, The Principal Princi-
ple: Controlling Creditors Should Be Held Liable for Their Debtor's Obligations, 19 U.C.
DAvis L. REV. 875, 914 (1986). This author was referring to third parties suing the creditor
for torts of the debtor, which is distinguishable from our hypothetical. Additionally, Schecter is
not completely correct. If the relationship is one in which there is sufficient control by the
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and that liability will attach if there is an agency relationship and
the activity was within the scope of employment. 7 '
Although a relationship may be characterized as an independent
contractor relationship rather than a master-servant relationship, this
does not mean that the independent contractor cannot take actions
that will result in liability for the principal. In a few instances, a
nonservant agent or independent contractor may create tort liability
for the principal based upon respondeat superior or a doctrine very
similar to it. These instances are the commission of a tort within the
inherent scope of the agency; that is, those torts committed during.
the very act for which the agent was employed. Since most non-
servant agents in lender-appointed individual scenarios such as the
earlier hypothetical are hired to achieve a legal or rather abstract,
non-physical result, the torts creating the principal's liability are
those of a non-physical nature. The torts that most often arise in the
lender-borrower relationship are misrepresentation, fraud, deceit,
conversion, and interference with contractual relations. 17 4
c. Was the Act Committed in the Scope of the
Employment?
If an agency relationship is shown to exist, then the critical ele-
ment necessary for holding a principal liable for the torts of an agent
is whether the tortious acts were done within the scope of the em-
ployment.1 7 5 Some courts hold that liability under the doctrine of
respondeat superior is not based upon the agency relationship but
rather an employer-employee relationship and that the "touchstone"
for liability is that the acts be committed in the course and scope of
the employment.176 This seems to be in serious conflict with opinions
such as Carver v. Crawford17 7 and Delk v. Board of Commission-
ers, 7 8 which hold that the agency relationship is the key to respon-
deat superior.
debtor to result in an agency relationship but not enough to amount to an "alter ego" or
"instrumentality" relationship, i.e., the debtor could not be defined as a "servant," then the
creditor will still be liable for the torts of the agent if they are committed in the scope of the
employment.
173. See infra Appendix for a chart detailing this proposition.
174. WOLFE & NAFFZIGER, supra note 66, at 127.
175. See Bush v. Bob Evans, 598 So.2d 952, 954 (Ala. Ct. App. 1992); Handy v. City of
Lawton, 835 P.2d 870, 872 (Okla. 1992).
176. E.g., Sloan v. Metropolitan Health Council, 516 N.E.2d 1104, 1109 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1987); Estate of Mathes v. Ireland, 419 N.E.2d 782, 786 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981).
177. Carver v. Crawford, 564 N.E.2d 330, 334 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990).
178. Delk v. Board of Commr's, 503 N.E.2d 436, 440 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987).
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This apparent conflict is explained in American Jurisprudence:
Fundamentally, and according to both the Restatement and
the American courts, there is no distinction to be drawn be-
tween the liability of a principal for the tortious act of his agent
and the liability of a master for the tortious act of his servant.
In both cases, the tort liability is based on the master and ser-
vant, rather than any agency, principle; the liability for the tor-
tious act of the employee is grounded upon the maxim of "re-
spondeat superior" and is to be determined by considering,
from a factual standpoint, the question whether the tortious act
was done while the employee, whether agent or servant, was
acting within the scope of his employment.
179
Once again the point is made that the distinction between an agent
and a servant is in fact irrelevant, despite the incorrect designations
by the court in Green.8' It is the distinction between independent
contractor and other agents that is important. The independent con-
tractor, if he or she is also an agent, will bind the principal if the
tort is committed "during the very act for which the agent was em-
ployed,"'18 while a servant will bind the principal so long as the act
is committed in the scope of the employment. It appears that the
Green and Burkett courts have failed to draw a distinction between
the terms "nonservant agent" and "independent contractor."
Wolfe and Naffziger indicate that it is possible for a nonservant
agent to be an independent contractor.' 82 The resulting analysis re-
quires a determination of whether an independent contractor does in
fact have an agency relationship with the principal. In other words,
under the Wolfe and Naffziger analysis, the two are not mutually
exclusive. There will be no liability of the principal if there is no
agency relationship. However, if there is an agency relationship, it
may still be characterized as a "nonservant/independent contractor"
relationship. 83 Here, the analysis diverges from the holding in
Green. While the nonservant agent relationship may be character-
ized as an "independent contractor," liability will be imputed for the
acts of the independent contractor if they are done in the scope of the
employment. 84 However, not all independent contractors are non-
servant agents, so there is a second category of independent contrac-
179. 3 AM. JUR. 2D Agency § 280 (1986) (citations omitted).
180. See supra text accompanying notes 128-41.
181. WOLFE & NAFFZIGER, supra note 66, at 127.
182. Id. at 125-30.
183. Id.
184. Id.
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tors whose acts the principal will not be responsible.18 The proper
analysis, no matter how the agent is characterized, is to resolve the
issue of "scope of employment" to determine whether liability ex-
ists.' 86 For an employment relation to exist, there must be an agency
relationship87
"Conduct of a servant is within the scope of his employment if
it is not a serious departure from authorized conduct in manner or
space, [and] is actuated in part by a motive to serve the master...
"188 The most basic element is the intent by the agent to act for the
principal. 8 9 However, even this element is not absolutely necessary
for a finding of liability.' 90
i. "On a Frolic of His Own"''
Generally, the principal will not be responsible for the acts of
the agent when the agent acts in his or her personal rather than
representative capacity. 9" However, disobedient acts of an agent
may still be attributed to the principal even when the agent acts in
his or her own interest, so long as he or she also advances the inter-
ests of the principal. 93
For example, in Horn v. Duke Homes,' 94 the plaintiff alleged
that she had been wrongfully discharged as a result of her refusal to
engage in sexual relations with her supervisor and sought damages
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.195 The defendant
alleged that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because
the superiors to the defendant's supervisor had neither approved nor
had knowledge of the misconduct.' 96 It was the defendant's position
185. Wolfe and Naffziger proclaim: "Adopting an iron clad rule in this matter is impos-
sible." Id. at 128. For an excellent illustration of the Wolfe and Naffziger analysis, see infra
Appendix.
186. 53 AM. JUR. 2D Master & Servant § 427 (1970).
187. Id. § 426.
188. SEAVEV, supra note 40, § 87, at 148.
189. See id.
190. See id.
191. The liability of a principal is severed if the tortious act occurred while the agent
was "on a frolic of his own." See Young B. Smith, Frolic and Detour, 23 COLUM. L. REV.
444 (1923). Smith states that "[ilt was Baron Parke who uttered the classic phrase that a
master is not responsible for injuries caused others by his servant's unauthorized negligence
while 'on a frolic of his own.'" Id. at 444 (citing Joel v. Morison, 6 C & P 501, 503 (1834)).
192. See, e.g., Stuteville v. Downing, 391 N.E.2d 629, 631 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979).
193. See SEAVEY, supra note 40, § 87, at 150; see also Smith, supra note 191, at 448-
49.
194. Horn v. Duke Homes, 755 F.2d 599 (7th Cir. 1985).
195. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1988); Horn, 755 F.2d at 601.
196. Horn, 755 F.2d at 603.
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that such misconduct was "wholly unconnected to the well-being of
the employer" and that, therefore, the supervisors acts were outside
the scope of employment. 97 However, the court held that "by dele-
gating power to [the supervisor] the "employer" and [the supervisor]
essentially merged; as long as the tort complained of was caused by
the exercise of this supervisory power, [the supervisor] should be...
held liable for the tort."' 98
This analysis seems to indicate that the principal will be held
liable for all acts of an agent who is given discretionary power over a
situation and then uses that discretionary power to commit the tort.
The idea is that the agent could not have committed the tort but for
the principal's action in putting the agent in the position and dele-
gating the power that allows the agent to take the action.
This analysis was not followed in Columbia Plaza Corp. v. Se-
curity National Bank,'99 however, where a lender was found not to
be liable for negligent administration of a construction loan.200 In
that case, the bank's officer was negligent in accepting a bribe, but
accepting the bribe was an act solely for the benefit of the officer and
not the bank. Therefore, the bank was not liable.2 'O
The cases that allow egregious conduct by agents to be consid-
ered within the scope of employment may be making a "cost-spread-
ing" consideration. Some commentators indicate that the courts need
to spread the costs of the activity among the persons connected with
i.202it.
2°
ii. The Concept of Ratification.
It is generally acknowledged that a principal may not retain the
benefits of unauthorized acts of an agent if the principal has knowl-
edge of them without imputation of liability to the principal. 20 3 Al-
197. Id. at 605.
198. Id.
199. Columbia Plaza Corp. v. Security Nat'l Bank, 676 F.2d 780 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
200. Id. at 792.
201. Id. at 787-88.
202. See Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts,
70 YALE L.J. 499, 500-02 (1961); Guido Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation
and Liability Rules-A Comment, 11 J.L. & ECON. 67, 68-69 (1968); R.H. Coase, The Prob-
lem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 6-8 (1960); J. Terry Griffith, Note, Respondeat Supe-
rior and the Intentional Tort: A Short Discourse on How to Make Assault and Battery a
Part of the Job, 45 U. CIN. L. REV. 235 (1976). But see Alan 0. Sykes, The Economics of
Vicarious Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 1231, 1278 (1984) ("The proposal to impose joint and
several liability on all agencies is clearly an inefficiently broad extension of vicarious
liability.").
203. A principal's knowledge will be irrelevant if the agent perpetrates fraud. Any mis-
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though the case may be such that the principal, under the general
rule, is not charged in the first instance with the knowledge of an
agent who is acting adversely to him, or fraudulently or illegally,
[t]he doctrine of imputed knowledge may be invoked where the
principal fails to disavow what was assumed to be said and done
in his behalf by the agent; and if the principal learns the facts
before his position has changed and still knowingly retains a
benefit obtained through the act of the agent which he would
not have received otherwise, he cannot escape responsibility." 4
Thus, although the agent may take unauthorized actions outside the
scope of his or her employment that would not ordinarily subject the
principal to liability, liability may still attach if the principal know-
ingly accepted the benefits of the unauthorized act. This describes
the concept of ratification.2"'
The Restatement defines ratification as "the affirmance by a
person of a prior act which did not bind him but which was done
professedly on his account, whereby the act, as to some or all per-
sons, is given effect as if originally authorized by him."2" Ratifica-
tion is an important concept because it does not rely upon either
actual or circumstantial authority. Rather, it is simply an act that
could have been authorized and was done on the principal's behalf.
All that is left for liability to attach is an affirmation by the princi-
pal. This affirmation can take the form of either actual or implied
knowledge by the principal of the action.20 7 Affirmation will usually
be a negative, that is, the failure of the principal to act-thereby
tacitly approving of the action taken by the agent. 08
A ratification will only apply if an agent takes some unautho-
rized acts that would otherwise not subject the principal to liability,
but the principal opens himself to liability by affirming the actions
or authorizing them after the fact.2" 9 As discussed above, it is not
representation made in the scope of the agency will result in liability of the principal on the
theory that where both the principal and the third party are innocent, it is better to place the
burden upon the principal than the third party. Bischoff Realty, Inc. v. Ledford, 562 N.E.2d
1321, 1324 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990); see also Steven N. Bulloch, Fraud Liability Under Agency
Principles: A New Approach, 27 WILLIAM & MARY L. REV. 301, 303-07 (1986).
204. 3 AM. JUR. 2D Agency § 291 (1986) (citations omitted).
205. See Aaron D. Twerski, The Independent Doctrine of Ratification v. The Restate-
ment and Mr. Seavey, 42 TEMP. L.Q. 1, 1 (1968).
206. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 82 (1958).
207. SEAVEY, supra note 40, § 36 at 65.
208. See Elliot Axelrod, The Doctrine of Implied Ratification-Application and Limi-
tations, 36 OKLA. L. REV. 849, 852 (1983).
209. E.g., Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc. v. Leach, 583 F.2d 367, 369 (7th Cir. 1978);
Arthur Gregory, Note, Agency-Ratification of an Unauthorized Act, 19 S.C. L. REV. 788,
19931
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
necessary that the principal expressly affirm or ratify the action; si-
lence will act as a ratification if the principal knowingly accepts the
benefits of the unauthorized acts.21' The knowledge element requires
that the principal be aware of all material facts for the ratification to
expose the principal to liability. 211 Similarly, the third party must
not be aware of a limit on the agent's power, or the principal cannot
ratify an act in contravention of that power.212
The cases do indicate that for ratification to apply, the agent
must act for or on behalf of the principal. 13 It is unclear what the
result would be if the agent were acting in the interest of himself and
the principal.
d. Application of Apparent Authority to Tort Liability
The concept of apparent authority was examined earlier in the
context of a principal's liability for contracts entered into by the
agent. 14 "The concept is growing and changing not only a princi-
pal's liability for an agent's contracts but, just as important, it is
imposing new types of liability on the principal for the agent's tor-
tious conduct.121 5 This doctrine usually applies in situations in
which the principal has made representations about an independent
contractor that would lead the third party to reasonably believe that
the independent contractor is actually an agent of the principal.
The most common examples of this are the service station cases.
In these cases, typified by Gizzi v. Texaco, Inc.,210 persons injured
by operators of service stations sue major oil companies. The oil
companies defend by claiming that they are not responsible for the
actions of the operators, who are independent contractors. This de-
fense will work, so long as the oil company has not held the operator
out to be a "servant" of the oil company, and, thereby, cloaking the
789-91 (1967).
210. E.g., Sea Lion Corp. v. Air Logistics, 787 P.2d 109, 117 (Alaska 1990); Gates v.
Bank of America, 261 P.2d 545, 548 (Cal. Ct. App. 1953); Stone Mountain Aviation, v. Rol-
lins Leasing Corp., 329 S.E.2d 247, 248 (Ga. App. Ct. 1985); Western Fertilizer & Cordage
Co. v. BRG, Inc., 424 N.W.2d 588 (Neb. 1988); see also Warren A. Seavey, Ratification by
Silence, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 30, 34-35 (1954).
211. Seavey, supra note 210, at 38-39; Testa v. Roberts, 542 N.E.2d 654, 659 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1988); see also SEAVEY, supra note 40, § 36, at 65.
212. See Warren A. Seavey, Ratification-Purporting to Act as Agent, 21 U. CHI. L.
REv. 248 (1954).
213. See, e.g., Beneficial Mortgage Co. v. Powers, 550 N.E.2d 793, 796 (Ind. Ct. App.
1990); Bryan v. Pommert, 37 N.E.2d 720, 723 (Ind. Ct. App. 1941).
214. See supra text accompanying notes 45-47.
215. WOLFE & NAFFZIGER, supra note 66, at 90.
216. Gizzi v. Texaco, Inc., 437 F.2d 308 (3d Cir. 1971).
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operator with apparent authority.2" In the Gizzi case, the Texaco
slogan was, "Trust your car to the man who wears the star." ' The
Third Circuit decided that this advertising had given the public the
impression that Texaco operators were the servants of Texaco and
that Texaco was vouching for their competence as auto mechanics,
thereby accepting responsibility for the acts of the operators.2 19
When a man had his brakes repaired by a Texaco mechanic, and the
brakes later failed, Texaco was held liable for the resulting
injuries.2 '
e. Serving Two Principals and the Resultant Liability
An agency relationship may arise out of "an agreement to em-
ploy the agent of another, such person then becoming the agent of
the first party. '  Thus, it is possible for an agent to represent the
interests of two separate principals in conducting a single act.222
This raises the difficult issue of which principal should be held liable
for the act of the agent when the act is tortious.
Ordinarily, where the agent serves two principals, each with the
knowledge and consent of the other, neither will be liable to the
other for the tortious acts of the agent if the principal did not partici-
pate in the tortious acts in any way.228 Since the principals are under
an equal duty to supervise the agent and protect their own interests,
the agent's misconduct is not imputed to any principal who is not
actually at fault. 4
On the other hand, a principal may be held liable to the other
217. See sources cited supra note 165.
218. Gizzi, 437 F.2d at 310.
219. Id.
220. Id.; see also Dickey, supra note 162; Robert N. Davis, Comment, Service Station
Torts: Time for the Oil Companies to Assume Their Share of the Responsibility, 10 CAL. W.
L. REV. 382 (1975); Thomas Toner, Comment, Liability of Oil Companies for the Torts of
Service Station Operators, 7 LAND & WATER L. REV. 263 (1972).
221. 1 I.L.P. Agency § 3 (1988) (citing Andrews v. Votaw, 240 Ill. App. 311 (1926), in
which the employee of the maker of a note to whom the note was given for safe-keeping by an
agreement between the maker and the payee became an agent of the payee).
222. SEAVEY, supra note 40, § 85, at 146; see Melissa Cassedy, Note, The Doctrine of
Lender Liability, 40 U. FLA. L. REv. 165, 179 (1988) (citing State Nat'l Bank v. Farah Mfg.
Co., 678 S.W.2d 661, 691-92 (Tex. App. Ct. 1984) to "illustrate[] how liability can result
from interlocking directorships when, in essence,.the directors are serving two masters").
223. 3 C.J.S. Agency § 430 (1973) (citing Ringer v. Wilkin, 183 P. 986 (Idaho 1919);
Boss v. Tomaras, 232 N.W. 229 (Mich. 1930); Rodgers v. Ward, 8 N.Y.S.2d 167, affd, 11
N.Y.S.2d 240 (1939); United Ass'n of Journeymen v. Borden, 328 S.W.2d 739 (Tex. 1959);
Anderson v. Brotherhood of Painters, 330 S.W.2d 541, affd in part, rev'd in part on other
grounds, 338 S.W.2d 148 (Tex. 1960)).
224. 3 C.J.S. Agency § 430 (1973).
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principal where he is directly connected with the tort committed
by the agent, as where there was collusion with the agent, active
participation in the wrongful act, or the wrongful act is other-
wise authorized or ratified. 2
While it may be unfair to hold a principal liable to the other for the
tortious acts of their mutual agent, one principal may be held liable
if that principal was involved in, was connected to, or had some re-
sponsibility for the agent's tortious acts.
f. Subagency
Where there is more than one possible level of agency, the doc-
trine of subagency is brought up.2 26 "A subagent is a person ap-
pointed by an agent empowered to do so, to perform functions un-
dertaken by the agent for the principal, but for whose conduct the
agent agrees with the principal to be primarily responsible. 2 2'  A
subagent serves two principals, and can create tort liability for both.
This is somewhat different from the hypothetical, where the two
principals are the lender and the borrower, rather than the principal
and the appointing agent, but the important concept is that two par-
ties may share liability for the actions of a single agent.
In order to impose liability on the agent for the tortious conduct
of a sub-agent, the same type of analysis we used when present-
ing the respondeat superior doctrine must be utilized. The rela-
tionship between agent and sub-agent must be properly classi-
fied as a master-servant one if a tort within the scope of (or
incidental to the purpose of) the agency has been committed. 22 8
Thus, if a subagent commits a tort within the scope of the employ-
ment, the principal will be liable for that tort.
III. CONTROL AND INTERFERENCE ACTIONS USING THE
AGENCY THEORY
With the foregoing harmonization of agency law, holding a
lender liable for actions in which the lender wrongfully takes control
of a borrower becomes easier to understand. The agency principles
225. Id. citing United Ass'n v. Borden, 328 S.W.2d 739 (Tex. 1959); Anderson v.
Brotherhood, 330 S.W.2d 541, aff d in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 338 S.W.2d 148
(Tex. 1960).
226. See generally Stotroen v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 736 P.2d 391 (Colo. 1987) and 2A
C.J.S. Agency § 35 (1972) for good discussions of subagency principles.
227. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 5(l) (1958).
228. WOLFE & NAFFZIGER, supra note 66, at 169.
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discussed above may be applied primarily in two ways. First, a bor-
rower may proceed on a straight respondeat superior theory. The
trouble the borrower will face if it chooses to follow this path is that
there is case law which essentially holds that a lender must practi-
cally step into the shoes and become the "alter ego" of the bor-
rower." 9 Other cases require a showing that the lender use the bor-
rower as a mere instrumentality to accomplish the lender's ends."'
But these cases usually involve an action by one creditor against an-
other, and not a direct action by the borrower against the lender.
When a borrower sues directly, seeking recovery for damages it has
suffered as a result of the actions of the lender's agents, the analysis
should be different. Here we scrutinize the lender's right to control
the agent at the inception of the relationship, whether that relation-
ship was ever terminated, and the acts of the agent which caused
damage to the borrower. If the agent's acts were within the scope of
employment then the lender should be held responsible.
The second theory a borrower may proceed on is interference
with corporate governance through the lender's agents. "A lender
may expose itself to liability by interfering with the borrower's cor-
porate governance ".. 231 This interference is properly described as
"tortious" when a creditor exercises an inordinate amount of control
over its debtor. 38
2
Despite which theory the borrower proceeds on, it must initially
be understood that control alone is not bad or improper, nor does it
result in liability standing alone.233 In an article appearing in the
229. See, e.g., In re Beverages Int'l, Ltd., 50 B.R. 273, 282 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1985).
230. See, e.g., Krivo Indus. Supply Co. v. National Distillers and Chem. Corp., 483
F.2d 1098, 1104 (5th Cir. 1973); In re Process-Manz Press, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 333 (N.D. Ill.
1964) rev'd on other grounds, 369 F.2d 513 (7th Cir. 1966), cert denied 386 U.S. 957 (1967);
Harris Trust & Savings Bank v. Keig (In re Prima Co.), 98 F.2d 952 (7th Cir. 1938), cert
denied, 305 U.S. 658 (1939).
231. James C. Wirken & Troy L. Daugherty, Emerging Trends in Lender Liability,
TRIAL, July 1991, at 33, 37.
232. See Margaret H. Douglas-Hamilton, Creditor Liabilities Resulting from Improper
Interference with the Management of a Financially Troubled Debtor, 31 Bus. LAW. 343,
363-64 (1975); Phillip L. Kunkel, The Fox Takes Over the Chicken House: Creditor Interfer-
ence with Farm Management, 60 N.D. L. REV. 445, 463 (1984); William H. Lawrence,
Lender Control Liability: An Analytical Model Illustrated with Applications to the Rela-
tional Theory of Secured Financing, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1387, 1388 (1989); K. Thor Lund-
gren, Liability of a Creditor in a Control Relationship with Its Debtor, 67 MARQUETTE L.
REV. 523, 524-25 (1984); see Brian L. Becker, Note, Agency-Creditors and Buyers as Prin-
cipals: Beware of Too Much Control, 32 KAN. L. REV. 497, 504-05 (1984); Jeffrey J. Hass,
Comment, Insights Into Lender Liability: An Argument for Treating Controlling Creditors
as Controlling Shareholders, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1321, 1321 (1987).
233. Lawrence, supra note 232, at 1388.
19931
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
Yale Law Journal, Oliver Williamson argues that lenders in certain
situations should be represented on a debtor's board of directors."3 4
In fact, in many early "lender liability" cases, courts held that the
"installation of an officer of the creditor may be proper as 'a legiti-
mate and customary practice of keeping an oversight . . . over the
business, management and operations of a debtor of doubtful sol-
vency.' ""' Such bank representatives were sometimes even allowed
to participate in the day-to-day management of their debtors' busi-
nesses, especially when the arrangements were voluntarily agreed to
by the debtor.2" The existence of an agency relationship, which in
turn relies on the control, may also open the door to liability. 287 "[I]t
would seem easy to apply agency law to the typical creditor control
fact pattern. It is surprising, therefore, that so few courts or litigants
have done so." '' 8
It is not proposed that installment of an officer of the creditor
into the business of the debtor is wrong-some control of a borrower
by its lender may be a good thing. Rather, it is proposed that if a
lender chooses to install "hand picked minions" into the borrower's
operation, the borrower should be able to look to the lender for com-
pensation when those individuals cause damage to the borrower.
A. Agency and Tortious Interference with Corporate Governance
The leading case on the issue of tortious interference with cor-
porate governance is State National Bank v. Farah Manufacturing
Co.2" 9 This section of the article will discuss the finer points of the
Farah Manufacturing Co. opinion that discuss this new theory of
liability.240
In the Farah Manufacturing Co. case, the Texas Appellate
Court found evidence sufficient to support a verdict that was based
234. Oliver Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YALE L.J. 1197, 1211 (1984).
235. Margaret H. Douglas-Hamilton, When are Creditors in Control of Debtor Com-
panies, PRAC. LAW, Oct. 15, 1980, at 61, 69.
236. Id. at 69-70 (citing Lawrence v. Muter Co., 171 F.2d 380 (7th Cir. 1948); Ameri-
can S. Trust Co. v. McKee, 293 S.W. 50 (Ark. 1927)).
237. Werner F. Ebke & James R. Griffin, Lender Liability to Debtors: Toward a Con-
ceptual Framework, 40 Sw. L.J. 775, 791 (1986).
238. Schechter, supra note 172, at 915.
239. State Nat'l Bank v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
240. For good background on the Farah Manufacturing Co. case, see Ebke & Griffin,
supra note 237 at 777-82. When a LEXIS search was run using the term "tortious interfer-
ence with corporate governance," the computer located no cases, state or federal. By slightly
modifying the search, the computer located only Farah Manufacturing Co. This case has also
been Shepardized ad nauseam, but has not been cited very often.
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in part upon "interference with business relations." The court stated
that "[i]nterference with another's business relations with a third-
party is actionable only if the interference is motivated by malice and
no useful purpose of the inducing party is subserved. ' 24 1 At first
blush, it looks as if Farah Manufacturing Co. is using the "tortious
interference with contractual relations" that is discussed in so many
cases. However, the court was actually extending the concept of "tor-
tious interference with business relations" to cover an interference
with the management of the corporation itself.242 In doing so, the
court contradicted itself.
The court first set up the requirements for an action based on
interference: "To maintain the action for interference with the con-
tract, it must be established that (1) there was a contract subject to
interference, (2) the act of interference was willful and intentional,
(3) such intentional act was a proximate cause of Plaintiff's damage,
and (4) actual damage or loss occurred."24 The Bank argued that
on this statement of the law, it had not interfered "with an existing
or reasonably probable future contract or business relation. ' 244 The
court admitted that "actionable interference has traditionally been
found to fall within one of these two categories. "245 However, in the
next two paragraphs, the court seems to ignore the requirement of a
contract as an essential element of the tort of interference:
The central theme of FMC's case is that the lenders interfered
with FMC's own business relations and protected rights. Al-
though the lenders may have been acting to exercise legitimate
legal rights or to protect justifiable business interests, their con-
duct failed to comport with standards of fair play. Upon consid-
eration of the private interests of the parties and of the social
utility thereof, the social benefits derived from permitting the
lenders' interference are clearly outweighed by the harm to be
241. Farah Manufacturing Co., 678 S.W.2d at 688.
242. The tort of "tortious interference with corporate governance" can legitimately be
considered to have been born in the Farah Manufacturing Co. case. Unfortunately, the case
has not been applied or interpreted by many courts in the years that followed its publication.
The commentators, have analyzed it extensively, but unfortunately, we are without much pre-
cedent. Lenders are advised to proceed cautiously, however. See Richard Greene, The Judge
Hates a Bossy Lender, FORBES, Oct. 10, 1983, at 102. "Years ago the banks could say, 'Your
Comptroller's an idiot, you've got to get rid of this guy.' Now he says, 'There seems to be some
trouble in your comptroller's department, you should look at some things for possible change.'
You hope he gets the idea.' " Id. (quoting an attorney representing lenders).
243. Farah Manufacturing Co., 678 S.W.2d at 689 (quoting Armendariz v. Mora, 553
S.W.2d 400, 404 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
244. Id. at 690.
245. Id.
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expected therefrom.
In view of the foregoing principles, the evidence is legally
sufficient that the lenders interfered with FMC's business rela-
tions, its election of directors and officers and its protected
rights. FMC was entitled to have its affairs managed by compe-
tent directors and officers who would maintain a high degree of
undivided loyalty to the company.
2 6
The court essentially re-drafted the elements of "interference" that it
reiterated earlier. Under the court's holding in Farah Manufactur-
ing Co., it is no longer necessary that there be a contract with a third
party that is interfered with. Rather, the willful interference with
the election of officers and directors is sufficient. Farah Manufactur-
ing Co. justifies this holding on policy grounds.24 7
The holding in Farah Manufacturing Co. has been called "un-
precedented. 248 It is clear that the Farah Manufacturing Co. court
expanded the concept of the tort of interference, which prior to that
time had only existed for an interference with contractual relations.
The Restatement defines the tort of interference as the following:
One who intentionally and improperly interferes with the per-
formance of a contract ... between another and a third person
by inducing or otherwise causing the third person not to per-
form the contract, is subject to liability to the other for the pecu-
niary loss resulting to the other from the failure of the third
person to perform the contract. 2 9
"Although some courts have held that the theory of interference
will protect ordinary business relations, the Farah Manufactur-
ing Co. court expanded the theory of interference beyond mere
business relations to afford legal protection to the corporate gov-
ernance rights of debtor corporations and their shareholders. 2 .2"
Ebke & Griffin state that "Farah Manufacturing Co. will
serve ... as a legal catalyst in an increasingly liability oriented
environment. 2 51
It is interesting to note that one of the defenses raised by the
lender was that once its chosen officers were inserted onto the FMC
board, it no longer dictated their actions. In response to this argu-
246. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
247. The court stated, "the social benefits derived from permitting the lenders' interfer-
ence are clearly outweighed by the harm to be expected therefrom." Id.
248. Ebke & Griffin, supra note 237, at 788.
249. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (1977).
250. Ebke & Griffin, supra note 237, at 788.
251. Id. at 800.
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ment, the court wrote that "the acts of the lenders ... set in motion
a chain of foreseeable events from which FMC sustained injury and
for which State National may be held accountable. 2 52 Thus, Farah
Manufacturing Co. dispenses with an agency analysis, and simply
uses the ordinary tort standard of foreseeability. " '5
Farah Manufacturing Co.'s expansion must be balanced
against the earlier case of Del State Bank v. Salmon.254 There, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed a jury award of damages for a
bank's wrongful interference with the borrower's employment con-
tract.255 The court felt that a lender is privileged to interfere in its
borrower's affairs so long as its motivation for doing so is "to better
its financial position with respect to the loans and not to wrongfully
harm the borrower. '2 5" Farah Manufacturing Co. is thus a signifi-
cant departure from the holding in Del State Bank.
Is this departure from precedent really necessary? Ebke and
Griffin do not think so. "Under Farah Manufacturing Co.'s unprec-
edented expansion of the interference theory the establishment of a
specific contract or prospective contractual relationship does not seem
to be essential to an actionable claim for interference in a debtor's
corporate governance. 25 7 Farah Manufacturing Co. ultimately rests
upon a straight tort analysis. The bank took some action which it
should have foreseen would result in damage to the borrower. Be-
cause the Farah Manufacturing Co. court had determined that a
fiduciary duty existed between the bank and the borrower, this ac-
tion was improper.
The problem with this "straight tort" analysis of Farah Manu-
facturing Co. is two-fold. First, the theory has not been widely em-
braced. While Farah Manufacturing Co. is cited often in Texas, it
is rarely cited elsewhere.2 58 This may be the result of a conception.
that Texas is an overly protective state for debtors.259 The second
252. Farah Manufacturing Co., 678 S.W.2d at 692.
253. See PROSSER, supra note 17, at 288-309.
254. Del State Bank v. Salmon, 548 P.2d 1024 (Okla. 1976).
255. Id. at 1028.
256. Lawrence F. Flick & Dennis Replansky, Liability of Banks To Their Borrowers:
Pitfalls and Protections, 103 BANKING L.J. 220, 238 (1986); Del State Bank, 548 P.2d at
1027.
257. Ebke & Griffin, supra note 237, at 788-89.
258. According to the authors' research, the Farah Manufacturing Co. opinion had
been cited 31 times by Texas courts but only 48 times altogether as of this article's publication
date.
259. See In re Fernandez, 855 F.2d 218, 221 (5th Cir. 1988); Armour Fertilizer Works
v. Sanders, 63 F.2d 902 (6th Cir. 1933); In re Baker, 182 F. 392, 394 (6th Cir. 1910) ("It has
been the policy of the State of Texas in its Constitution and legislation, as construed by the
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problem with Farah Manufacturing Co. is that the analysis would
seem to sweep extremely broadly. That is, any time a lender exer-
cises control over a borrower, it is foreseeable that some damage may
be suffered by the borrower. In this sense, the Farah Manufactur-
ing Co. opinion could be analyzed to be a "strict liability" for lend-
ers case. An application of agency theory, however, would eradicate
these problems while achieving the same result.
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that the key to finding lia-
bility on an interference claim is control.2" "Because the theory of
agency embodies fiduciary principles, . . . a controlling creditor may
owe a fiduciary duty to its debtor." '261 In other words, if the lender
has placed an agent into the operation of its borrower, it has inter-
fered with the borrower's corporate governance and may have in-
curred a fiduciary obligation. "The consequences of finding such a
fiduciary relationship are dramatic because the lender must put the
borrower's interests first." '262 Finally, "it appears that no simple rule
or formula of what constitutes control exists because the existence of
a control relationship 'necessarily depends upon the cumulative im-
pact of the facts and circumstances of the particular case.' "268
In Credit Managers Association v. Superior Court, a Califor-
nia appellate court found that where a bank threatened to call a loan
unless the borrower hired a business consultant, the borrower had a
cause of action. 264 The consultant in that case had "supplanted and
overruled the board of directors. '"2 65 The court found that it was the
placement of a person into the borrower's operation whose allegiance
was primarily to the lender was improper.
decisions of its Supreme Court, to favor by liberal interpretations the exemptions in favor of
debtors.") (quoting Duncan v. Ferguson-McKinney Dry Goods Co., 150 F. 269, 271 (5th Cir.
1907)); see also Matthew A. Rosenstein, New Statute Helps Debtors 'Take the Cure,' TEX.
LAW., July 15, 1991, at 18 ("Texas has always been a debtor-oriented state, with some of the
most liberal exemption laws in the United States."); Lee R. Bogdanoff, Exemptions Under the
Bankruptcy: Using California's New Homestead Law as a Medium for Analysis, 72 CAL. L.
REV. 922, 960 (1984); Judith S. Koffler, The Bankruptcy Clause and Exemption Laws: A
Reexamination of the Doctrine of Geographic Unformity, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 22, 26 (1983).
260. "Control may be manifested in several ways. A lender may obtain voting control,
participate on the debtor's board of directors, gain control of management, exert financial con-
trol, or interfere with the borrower's other contractual relationships." Cassedy, supra note
222, 170-72 (footnotes omitted).
261. Ebke & Griffin, supra note 237, at 794 (footnote omitted).
262. Cassedy, supra note 222, at 182.
263. Kunkel, supra note 232, at 451 (quoting James P. Koch, Bankruptcy Planning
for the Secured Lender, 99 BANKING L.J. 788 (1982)); see also Lundgren, supra note 234.
264. Credit Managers Ass'n v. Superior Court, 124 Cal. Rptr. 242, 244 (Cal. Ct. App.
1975).
265. Cassedy, supra note 222, at 179.
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However, a borrower may not be forced to rely upon the uncer-
tain expansion of interference by Farah Manufacturing Co..
Rather, the borrower may be successful in arguing that the bank
controlled the borrower through an agent, and therefore must bear
the responsibility for bad acts done by the agent in the scope of the
relationship.
B. Control of the Borrower by the Bank
Traditionally banks have been held liable for inordinate levels
of control of a borrower on a variety of theories including "instru-
mentality," "alter ego," and "equitable subordination. '"26 These
cases are somewhat similar to the Farah Manufacturing Co. case in
that they often turn upon the finding of a fiduciary relationship be-
tween the bank and its borrower.
Ordinarily there is no fiduciary relationship. between a bank
and its borrower.2 67 "The finding of a fiduciary relationship turns
upon whether 'such control over the decision-making process of the
debtor ... amounts to a domination of its will .. . .""' Absent the
court's finding of such a fiduciary relationship in Farah Manufac-
turing Co., there would have been no liability. For example, in the
factually similar case of In re Prima, no liability resulted where a
fiduciary relationship was not found.269 The Prima and Badger...
opinions are cited below as examples of the level of control necessary
266. Lundgren, supra note 232 at 523-25.
267. Samuel R. Miller & Angelo L. Calfo, The Fiduciary Duty of Lenders Through
Excessive Involvement Or Control Over Borrowers In Lender Liability Cases, in LENDER
LIABILITY LITIGATION 1988: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 187 (PLI 1988); see also Richard B.
Hagedorn, The Impact of Fiduciary Principles on the Bank-Customer Relationship in Wash-
ington, 16 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 803 (1980); Richard B. Hagedorn, Fiduciary Aspects of the
Bank-Customer Relationship, 34 Mo. B.J. 406 (1978).
268. Jeremy W. Dickens, Note, Equitable Subordination and Analogous Theories of
Lender Liability: Toward a New Model of "Control", 65 TEX. L. REV. 801, 835 (1987)
(citing Anaconda-Ericsson, Inc. v. Hessen (In re Teltronics Servs., Inc.), 29 B.R. 139, 170
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983)). The term "fiduciary" means "a person holding the character of a
trustee ... in respect to the trust and confidence involved in it and the scrupulous good faith
and candor which it requires." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 563 (5th ed. 1979). A fiduciary
"relationship exists when there is a reposing of faith, confidence and trust, and the placing of
reliance by one upon the judgment and advice of the other." Id. The Restatement of Trusts
states that a fiduciary "is under a duty to act for the benefit of the other as to matters within
the scope of the relation." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 cmt. b (1959). "A fiduci-
ary relationship exists whenever any person acquires a power of any type on condition that he
also receive with it a duty to utilize that power in the best interests of another, and the recipi-
ent of the power uses that power." J.C. SHEPHERD, THE LAW OF FIDUCIARIES 96 (1981).
269. Harris Trust & Say. Bank v. Keig (In re Prima), 98 F.2d 952 (7th Cir. 1938),
cert. denied, 305 U.S. 658 (1939).
270. In re Badger Freightways, Inc., 106 BR. 971 (Bankr N.D. 11. 1989).
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to incur lender liability for damages resulting from that control.
1. Prima & Badger
The Prima case involved a company that claimed it was forced
into bankruptcy by the wrongful control and mismanagement of the
company by its lender. 7' Prima was a brewery that was operating
prior to prohibition."' During prohibition, Prima manufactured
near-beer and ginger ale, and was one of only five breweries in Chi-
cago to survive prohibition. 27" Upon the repeal of prohibition, Prima
made a calculated estimate that sales of beer would increase signifi-
cantly, and that most sales would be in bottles. This was an incorrect
assumption, as bottled beer sales quickly peaked and then dropped
(beer sold in barrels met with more success).27 4 The company had
invested heavily in bottles and bottling equipment, and subsequently
lost a great deal of money. 7 Prima did its banking with Harris
Trust & Savings, who became dissatisfied with Prima's-manage-
ment.27 6 Harris therefore "suggested" the employment of Garnett C.
Skinner as manager. 7 7 Skinner was thereupon employed under an
employment contract with Prima. 7 8
The trial court realized that the company had a reasonable fear
that if they did not comply with the bank's suggestion that Skinner
be employed the loan would be called and they would be out of busi-
ness.279 The court referred to Skinner as both an "agent" and an
"instrumentality" of the bank.2 80 Unfortunately, the Seventh Circuit
disagreed.
The Court of Appeals found that "[tlhe relation between the
debtor and appellants was solely that of debtor and creditor, and it
was not found that at any time there was a fiduciary relation be-
tween them." '281 The court also noted that the bank allowed Prima
to suggest its own manager, but that the corporation had suggested
no one, because they did not wish to "discharge their old manager
271. Prima, 98 F.2d at 955.
272. Id. at 960-61.
273. Id. at 960.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 961.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 962.
280. Id. at 964.
281. Id.
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who had been with them for many years. '28 2 The court went on to
find that there was no threat or inducement by the bank to execute
the contract with Skinner, and that the bank was not present when
the contract was executed.2"' It was merely the belief of the debtor
that led to the execution of the contract.28 4 This would be sufficient
if the debtor were somehow inexperienced or easily influenced, but
these facts were not present.285
With the failure of their argument that forcing Skinner into
their business was tortious, Prima turned to the acts of Skinner once
he was in control. To support this argument, the company tried the
agency theory. They argued that the terms of the employment agree-
ment with Skinner placed "complete domination and control" in the
hands of the bank, and "that for this purpose Skinner became their
agent, and they were liable for his acts of mismanagement." '286 The
bank countered that the contract merely prevented a change of man-
agement without their consent, and did not put the operation of the
business within their "complete domination and control."2 ' The
court agreed, finding it significant that the company had retained
Skinner as manager for a period of ten years under a second contract
that was not known or approved by the bank.288
In addition to these facts, the Court of Appeals noted that the
company never complained about Skinner's management or criticized
him.28 9 The court felt that if Skinner were truly engaging in mis-
management as an agent of the bank, the company would have called
the bank to complain. 290 The court also found that even if the con-
tract had been procured by undue influence, the company later rati-
fied it by keeping Skinner once it learned of the influence and not
complaining to the bank.291
As stated above, the most significant aspect of Prima is that no
fiduciary relationship was found. The opinion can be criticized for
its "non-analysis" of the agency issue.292 That is, the court should
282. Id.
283. Id. at 964.
284. Id. at 964.
285. Id. at 965.
286. Id. at 966.
287. "Financial arrangements of a debtor that benefit the creditor to the debtor's detri-
ment constitute circumstantial evidence of the creditor's control and domination." Douglas-
Hamilton, supra note 235, at 73.
288. Prima, 98 F.2d at 966.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 967.
292. "Curiously, virtually all cases and treatises focus exclusively on control as the test
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have considered how much control the bank exercised over Skinner
at the time Skinner was being retained as the manager of Prima.
The holding would be the same if the court determined that the bank
exercised no control over Skinner. It is also important to realize that
the court was looking at the relationship between the lender and the
borrower, and not the lender and its chosen individual, Skinner.
The absence of a fiduciary duty was again the key to the ruling
of Judge Schmetterer of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
Northern District of Illinois in In re Badger Freightways, Inc.29 In
Badger, a trucking company alleged that its lender, Continental
Bank, "suggested" the employment of a former Continental em-
ployee as the chief operating officer of Badger."" The bank allegedly
told Badger that it "should" let the new officer and another person
selected by the bank run the business, and that Badger's current of-
ficers "should not" involve themselves in the day-to-day management
of the business. 95
In its bankruptcy, Badger alleged that these two individuals en-
gaged in improper conduct, including the failure to properly keep
accounting records and make income tax payments on time.296
Badger fired one of them, and the other left without notice upon the
firing.297 Badger alleged in its bankruptcy case that these two indi-
viduals were the agents of Continental.2 98
Badger filed an adversary action in the bankruptcy court seek-
ing equitable subordination of Continental's claims, based upon the
alleged improper acts of Continental. 299 The court recognized that
usually a financial institution does not have a fiduciary relationship
of agency, without discussing whether the agent had been acting both under the principal's
control and on the principal's behalf, as is required by section 1(1)of the Second Restatement."
Schechter, supra, note 172, at 910. The Prima opinion not only does not consider whether the
"agent" was acting on the principal's behalf, but does not even engage in a control analysis.
The Prima case is thus a good example of how the same facts can come out differently de-
pending on whether a court analyzes the case under the "instrumentality rule" or under
agency principles.
293. In re Badger Freightways, Inc., 106 B.R. 971 (Bankr. N.D. Il1. 1989).
294. Id. at 973, 978-79.
295. Id. at 973.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 973.
298. Id.
299. The complaint sought the determination of lien priority and included a preference
action. These are core matters over which the bankruptcy court has jurisdiction by reference
from the district court. However, on the "breach of asserted duty" count in the complaint, the
bankruptcy judge did not have jurisdiction to enter a final order. This was a non-core action,
and as such would be reviewed de novo by the district court, after proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law by the bankruptcy court.
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with its borrower.3 0 0
An exception to this general rule exists when the lending insti-
tution exerts "dominion and control" over its customer. The ra-
tionale behind this exception is significant. If the lending insti-
tution usurps the power to make business decisions from the
customer's board of directors and officers, then it must also un-
dertake the fiduciary obligation that the officers and directors
owe the corporation (and its creditors). This reasoning also dic-
tates the scope of the term "control." What is required is oper-
ating control of the debtor's business, because only in that situa-
tion does a creditor assume the fiduciary duty owed by the
officers and directors.301
The court noted that "close monitoring of the debtor's finances" and
"making business recommendations" were inadequate to establish
control.30
2
Thus, the court held that on the motion to dismiss by Continen-
tal, Badger had to show facts that would support both the existence
and breach of a fiduciary duty owed to Badger by Continental, or
gross misconduct by Continental.3"3 The court found that neither ex-
isted, and therefore granted the motion to dismiss.30 4 Although the
court recognized not only that notice pleading is to be construed lib-
erally, and that this is enhanced by the fact that the action is for
equitable subordination, which is even more liberal, it nevertheless
held that Badger had not alleged enough facts to support its cause. 5
Badger argued that all of the previous control and mismanagement
cases had been decided after evidentiary hearings, and argued that it
should be provided with such a hearing at which it could present
evidence that would support its allegations.30 6 The judge declined to
grant them this opportunity.3 0 7 He felt that Badger had shown only
that Continental recommended they hire the two managers, that
there was a "close relationship" between one of the managers and
Continental, that the management of the business was turned over to
300. Badger, 106 B.R. at 976 (citing In re W.T. Grant Co., 699 F.2d 599, 609 (2d
Cir.) cert. den. sub. nom., Cosoff v. Rodman, 464 U.S. 822 (1983)).
301. Id. at 977.
302. Id. (citing In re Ludwig Honold Mfg. Co., 46 B.R. 125, 129 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1985); In re Osborne, 42 B.R. 988, 997 (W.D. Wis. 1984); In re Teltronics Services, Inc., 29
B.R. 139, 172 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983)).
303. Id. at 976-77.
304. Id. at 977.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 977-78.
307. Id. at 978.
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them on Continental's recommendation, and that Continental bene-
fited from the actions of the managers. 308 "Without factual allega-
tions showing the existence of an arrangement to control Badger, it is
clear that Continental's recommendation of these two men and their
subsequent management of Badger does not by itself establish control
and dominion."30 9
The court drew an analogy to Prima, quoting that portion of
the Prima opinion that held that the debtor's acquiescence in the
bank's recommendations was insufficient to constitute domination." 0
Without the existence of a fiduciary relationship, the debtor was un-
able to show any actionable misconduct by the bank.
The decisions of the courts in Prima and Badger may be criti-
cized on two grounds. First, they properly sought to ascertain
whether a fiduciary relationship existed, but they focused on the re-
lationship between the bank and the borrower, rather than on the
relationship between the bank and the individual acting on the
bank's behalf. Second, they failed to consider that if those individuals
were found to be the agents of the bank, then a fiduciary relationship
did exist, as between the bank and the agent. Therefore, when the
agent took action that was within the scope of that relationship, and
that action resulted in damage to the borrower, the bank could be
held liable on a respondeat superior theory. On the other hand,
these cases involved actions for equitable subordination, rather than
damages.
As shown by Farah Manufacturing Co., Prima, and Badger,
liability may be proven if the debtor can successfully plead and argue
that a fiduciary relationship existed between the bank and the
debtor. This may be established if it can be shown that the bank
controls the borrower by placing an agent into the borrower's opera-
tions. "It is the fact of control . . . that creates the fiduciary
obligation." '
2. Using Agency Theory In Control Cases
It would seem that one could simply apply straight agency theo-
ries, as discussed in the first half of this articlea1 to hold banks
liable for wrongful control borrowers. "It is surprising, therefore,
308. Id. at 978.
309. Id. at 978.
310. Id. (citing Prima, 98 F.2d at 965).
311. Southern Pac. Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483, 492 (1919).
312. See supra part I.
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that so few courts or litigants have done so.' l In fact, few courts
have done so. Prima used the instrumentality theory, requiring com-
plete domination and control of the debtor such that the debtor and
the creditor were for all intents and purposes the same entity. 14
Somewhat less control than required by the Prima court was re-
quired for the court in A. Gay Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill, Inc.,15
holding that recommendations on how to run the business, a right of
first refusal, veto power over contracts and dividends, right to entry
of premises for audits, control of finances, salaries, etc. all amounted
to a fiduciary relationship." 6 And, according to Farah Manufactur-
ing Co., the installation of management personnel into an operation
will result in a fiduciary relationship, yet even Farah Manufactur-
ing Co. does not apply agency theory.1 7
In Cargill, agency theory was used in an attempt to show that
the borrower itself was the agent of the lender.3 1  There the follow-
ing actions by the creditor amounted in a finding of control by the
principal sufficient to subject the principal liable for the agent's acts:
1. A number of suggestions were made about the day to day
operation of the business.
2. The creditor contacted the debtor daily.
3. The creditor's headquarters told the regional office that the
creditor had the power to make critical decisions regarding the
debtor's use of funds.
4. The creditor told several third-parties that there would be no
problem receiving payment from the debtor.
5. An officer of the creditor was sent to the debtor's business to
"supervise" its operation." 9
The court cited the Restatement of Agency in deciding that these
factors amounted to improper control of the debtor.32 0
A contrary case is Buck v. Nash-Finch Co. 2' In Buck, the cred-
itor insisted on the use of its own accountant by the debtor; the cred-
313. Schechter, supra note 172, at 915.
314. In re Prima Co., 98 F.2d 952, 966 (7th Cir. 1938).
315. A. Gay Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 309 N.W.2d 285 (Minn. 1981).
316. Id. at 291; see also Ebke & Griffin, supra note 237, at 793; Brian L. Becker,
Note, Agency-Credit'ors and Buyers as Principals: Beware of Too Much Control, 32 KAN.
L. REV. 499 (1984) (discussing A. Gay Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 309 N.W.2d 285
(Minn. 1981)).
317. Recall that Farah Manufacturing Co. justified its decision on policy bases. State
Nat'l Bank v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661, 690 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
318. Cargill, 309 N.w.2d at 290.
319. Id. at 289.
320. Id. at 291-92.
321. Buck v. Nash-Finch Co., 102 N.W.2d 84 (N.D. 1960).
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itor visited the debtor weekly to give advice, the creditor installed a
"store manager," and demanded the firing of certain employees of
the debtor."' Buck held that the creditor cannot be liable unless it
was in direct control over the specific activity of the agent giving rise
to the action. 2 ' This is a ridiculous holding. Once the agency was
established, the only remaining question should have been whether
the actions were within the scope of the employment. If the creditor
has sufficient control over the debtor, any act of the agent within the
scope of the agency may be imputed to the principal. By requiring
minutely particularized control as a precondition of liability, the
Buck court has blurred the distinction between master/servant rela-
tionships, which involve tight control, and ordinary agency."324
But here again, both Cargill and Buck were focused upon equi-
table subordination, and did not involve actions against the lender by
the borrower. What this section of the article has shown, however, is
that a lender who has subjected its borrower to control through the
insertion of unwanted personnel may face a cause of action against
the lender for wrongful control on the principles of respondeat
superior.
IV. CONCLUSION
This article set out to accomplish two things in four sections.
The intention was to first explain and discuss agency law and the
concept of respondeat superior. This was done by providing defini-
tions for terms such as "master," "servant," "nonservant agent," and
"independent contractor." Next, these concepts were applied to the
theory of respondeat superior to determine when a principal will be
held liable for actions of an agent. The article concluded that the
question of "control" is not important for imputing liability, but only
for determining whether the individual controlled is an agent. More
importantly, the article concluded that control is only relevant at the
inception of the agency relationship. Thereafter, in applying the con-
cept of respondeat superior, courts should only concentrate upon
whether the actions taken by the agent were within the scope of
employment.
322. Id. at 86-87.
323. Id. at 90-91.
324. Schechter, supra note 172, at 921. Schechter also discusses the Chicago Mill &
Lumber v. Boatmen's Bank case, which basically held that there could be no agency liability
absent an express agency agreement between the bank and the borrower. Schechter concludes
that "Chicago Mill is such a great departure from traditional agency law that it should be
given no weight." Schechter, supra note 172, at 922.
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The second thing this article set out to accomplish was an ap-
plication of these agency principles to lender liability. This was also
done in two sections. First, the relatively new tort of "tortious inter-
ference with corporate governance" was discussed. Such a cause of
action may be relied upon by a borrower who has had individuals
"forced" upon it by its lender. Lenders may be dissatisfied with the
management or governance of a corporate borrower, and may there-
fore seek to supplant the borrower's personnel with "hand-picked
minions" of their choosing. When these "minions" make poor deci-
sions or take other actions that result in damage to the b rrower, the
borrower may sue the lender on a theory of interference.
Because the expansion of the tort of interference has not been
widely recognized, the article has suggested that the borrower may
proceed directly on a theory of respondeat superior based upon the
lender's improper control of the borrower. The article examined and
rejected several other "control" cases, which mainly involved actions
by third parties seeking to hold a lender responsible for a debt owed
the third party by the borrower. These cases were criticized and dis-
tinguished as improperly applying agency law and/or being irrele-
vant to a direct action by the borrower against its lender.
In summary, the article addresses the situation where a lender
forces a borrower to accept an individual as a high ranking director
or officer and who subsequently causes damage to the borrower.
Without some clarification of agency principles, the borrower is left
without a remedy for improper conduct by the bank. Essentially, a
bank who forces an individual into a borrower's operation must be
willing to accept the responsibility for that individual's mistakes or
misconduct. Without the harmonization of agency law as described
in this article, borrowers are left only with a "control" test that
courts developed to deal with cases involving equitable subordina-
tion. This test is inadequate to address the legitimate concerns of
borrowers who are mistreated by their lenders.
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SERVANT
- Physical Result is
contemplated
- Full control over
Physical conduct
Legal Result: Principal -
Master LIABLE for
unintentional torts of
servant within scope of
agency - includes torts
incidental to scope of
agency.
APPENDIX3 25
INDEPENDENT
CONTRACTOR
IS NON-SERVANT
AGENT
- Abstract or legal result
contemplated
INCREASING CONTROL
- May be minimum
control over Physical
conduct
Legal Result: Principal
NOT liable for
unintentional torts of
non-servant agent
(independent contractor)
unless tort was
committed within
inherent scope
of employment.
INDEPENDENT
CONTRACTOR
NON-AGENT
- Independent contractor
works for employer
using his own skill
and judgment: I/C can
not bind employer
contractually
- No control over
physical conduct
Legal Result: Employer
NOT liable for torts of
I/C, unless task assigned
I/C was utrahazardous
or P interfered with the
work of the I/C.
325. Wolfe & Naffziger, supra note 66, at 129.
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